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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
FOUNDATIONAL FORENSIC TECHNIQUES FOR 
CELLULAR AND AD HOC MULTI-HOP NETWORKS 
by 
Xiwei Zhao 
Florida International University, 2008 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Niki Pissinou, Major Professor 
The Internet has become an integral part of our nation’s critical socio-economic 
infrastructure. With its heightened use and growing complexity however, organizations 
are at greater risk of cyber crimes. To aid in the investigation of crimes committed on or 
via the Internet, a network forensics analysis tool pulls together needed digital evidence. 
It provides a platform for performing deep network analysis by capturing, recording and 
analyzing network events to find out the source of a security attack or other information 
security incidents. Existing network forensics work has been mostly focused on the 
Internet and fixed networks. But the exponential growth and use of wireless technologies, 
coupled with their unprecedented characteristics, necessitates the development of new 
network forensic analysis tools.  
This dissertation fostered the emergence of a new research field in cellular and 
ad-hoc network forensics. It was one of the first works to identify this problem and offer 
 vi
fundamental techniques and tools that laid the groundwork for future research. In 
particular, it introduced novel methods to record network incidents and report logged 
incidents. For recording incidents, location is considered essential to documenting 
network incidents. However, in network topology spaces, location cannot be measured 
due to absence of a ‘distance metric’. Therefore, a novel solution was proposed to label 
locations of nodes within network topology spaces, and then to authenticate the identity 
of nodes in ad hoc environments. For reporting logged incidents, a novel technique based 
on Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) was adopted. Although the direct use of DHTs for 
reporting logged incidents would result in an uncontrollably recursive traffic, a new 
mechanism was introduced that overcome this recursive process.   
These logging and reporting techniques aided forensics over cellular and ad-hoc 
networks, which in turn increased their ability to track and trace attacks to their source. 
These techniques were a starting point for further research and development that would 
result in equipping future ad hoc networks with forensic components to complement 
existing security mechanisms. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Nowadays, the Internet has become an integral part of our nation’s critical 
socio-economic infrastructure and a progressively dominant role of an individual’s life 
for almost everything from shopping and banking to power grid and defense systems. 
With its heightened use and growing complexity, the Internet together with other types of 
computer networks such as cellular networks, sensor networks, or ad hoc networks 
greatly enriched people’s lives; however, the advances in computer networks also 
energize those with questionable motives to abuse services provided over networks and 
disrupt social framework. This situation makes network security a critical issue that 
should be a necessary in designing any types of computer networks. 
As a sub-field of network security, Network Forensics is “the next step in the 
analysis of network attacks, intrusions, and misuses” [Rob06]. During the investigation of 
crimes committed on via computer networks, a network forensic analyst initially should 
collects the related evidence remaining after the crimes in order to trace offending actions 
back and hopefully to locate and identify these perpetrators. Typically, a network forensic 
analyst starts his work only after a criminal offence has been committed or an alarm has 
been triggered. Compared to real-time monitoring or strategies i.e. intrusion detection, 
network forensics is based on evidence left after the completed or attempted crimes and 
remaining within computer networks.  
 1
Intuitively, the more evidence of an unwelcome activity or intrusion enduring in the 
networks and more information included in the evidence, the greater the chance that the 
intruder and its misbehaviors may be traced back and identified. Therefore, specialized 
technologies should be provided to support basic monitoring functions of capturing and 
recording network activities so that sentinel actions to guard users of computer networks 
against security breaches and related incidents can be carried out.  
=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= 
03/28-11:00:08.909078 131.94.119.3:1985 -> 224.0.0.2:1985 
UDP TTL:1 TOS:0xC0 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:48 
Len: 20 
00 00 08 01 04 55 64 00 43 45 41 53 00 00 00 00  .....Ud.CEAS.... 
83 5E 77 01                                       
=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= 
03/28-11:00:09.144240 ARP who-has 192.168.1.99 tell 131.94.119.112 
03/28-11:00:09.275474 ARP who-has 192.168.1.1 tell 192.168.1.238 
03/28-11:00:09.497014 10.94.119.2:1985 -> 224.0.0.2:1985 
UDP TTL:1 TOS:0xC0 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:48 
Len: 20 
00 00 10 01 04 6E C8 00 43 45 41 53 00 00 00 00  .....n..CEAS.... 
0A 5E 77 01                                       
=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= 
03/28-11:00:09.666863 ARP who-has 10.94.119.44 tell 10.94.119.44 
03/28-11:00:09.739699 10.94.119.3:1985 -> 224.0.0.2:1985 
UDP TTL:1 TOS:0xC0 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:48 
Len: 20 
00 00 08 01 04 55 C8 00 43 45 41 53 00 00 00 00  .....U..CEAS.... 
0A 5E 77 01                                      
=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= 
Figure 1-1. An example of log files 
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As shown in Figure 1-1, ‘data logging’ is the principal and wide accepted technology 
employed to promptly record network incidents within a certain scope. At every node (or 
computer host) of a network, a computer program regarding ‘data logging’ runs and 
keeps recording network incidents occurred within the surrounding area where the node 
is watching. Due to the overlap of the watching scopes, a network incident may be 
documented more than once by several nodes that monitored the incident from their own 
perspectives, and later, forensic analysis can be processed by examining the documents 
from all these nodes that involved in the incident as participants or as auditors. 
Furthermore, by collecting, inspecting and analyzing all documents from ‘data logging’ 
throughout the network, any incident occurred within the scope of the whole network can 
always be traced. 
Unfortunately, direct approaches always leave a lot to be desired, because the 
technology of ‘data logging’ may be challenged or disrupted, and also because the 
documents generated from the process of ‘data logging’ (or log files) may be distorted or 
destructed. Specifically, criminals or hackers often hide their trails or spoof their 
identities before initiating an intrusion or a widespread disruption. Even worse, an 
accomplished hacker may simple erase all or parts of log files related to his offending 
actions after his successful intrusion into computers or computer networks.  
In order to clearly illustrate challenges that network forensics would face, a typical 
example of network offenses via the Internet is presented in detail. First, a hacker turns 
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on a computer with access to the Internet. Through this computer, the hacker logs in at a 
public server as a normal user. This public server is generally called a stepping stone of 
the following perpetrations, and in this way the hacker disguises the ID of his current 
computer by hiding himself behind the public server. After that, the hacker attempts to 
search and locate security holes on a target computer by issuing probing packets from the 
public server. Mostly, the probing packets are a series of applications for anonymous 
services provided by the target computer. In case a security hole of buffer overflow has 
been located on the target computer, the hacker launches an intrusion by injecting a piece 
of executable code into the network service with the security hole. Moreover, if the 
network service had special privileges, the hacker could then obtain super-user privilege 
on the target computer, and a successful intrusion has been completed.  
Figure 1-2. A typical intrusion over the Internet 
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Actually, based on log files of nodes within a computer network, completed or 
attempted network crimes can always be traced. For the example above, the procedure of 
this network intrusion is documented through the mechanism of ‘data logging’ at nodes 
involved in. On the public server, the login transaction of the hacker would be recorded, 
as are the actions of sending probing packets out. On the target computer, the hacker’s 
probations (or frequent service requests from the public server) are logged, as is the 
exception of buffer overflow. Therefore, an investigation of this intrusion can start from 
the target computer. By analyzing log files maintained at the target computer, the stepping 
stone of the intrusion, i.e. that public server, would be located. Furthermore, with the log 
files from the stepping stone collected and analyzed, the hacker’s computer may be 
spotted afterward.  
However, some log files may be unavailable during the investigation to trace the 
intrusion back. In the typical network intrusion illustrated above, the hacker may become 
a super-user and fully control the target computer. Subsequently, the hacker would tamper 
with or simply remove the log files maintained at the target computer. As a result, the 
investigation can not go any further, since the investigator can not locate that public 
server (i.e. the stepping stone of the intrusion,) without indication from these destructed 
log files, let alone the computer of the hacker. Even through the evidence of the intrusion 
was documented at the public server, it has not been reported or published and no other 
nodes can associate these documents at the public server with the tragedy occurred at the 
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target computer. Therefore, the investigator has no way to know that there still exists 
evidence of the intrusion at the public server. Moreover, since there are thousands of 
public servers scattered across the Internet, a wild search throughout all of these public 
servers is hardly conductive and infeasible.  
In addition, the example of network intrusions discussed above is via the Internet 
which falls into the category of fixed networks. In mobile networks, the challenges of 
network forensics get even more serious. If the network intrusion is launched over a 
mobile network, especially a mobile ad hoc network, additional issues regarding network 
forensics must be taken into account. Within a mobile network, each node or computer, 
no matter whether it is a hacker or a normal node, would move arbitrarily without a fixed 
address. As a result, hackers can attack one computer at one place and then move to 
another place to avoid being traced. Also, nodes may join or leave an ad hoc network 
arbitrarily. As a result, a hacker may join the network with an identifier, and misbehave 
all the time. After that, the hacker simply leaves the network, and then joins the network 
again with another identifier to escape punishment. Therefore, old principles and 
techniques behind forensics for fixed networks cannot be employed for mobile networks 
as they do not have the underlying infrastructure older protocols so comfortably assumed 
to have existed.  
In summary, the network forensics is primarily based on log files. With these log files 
a forensic analysis can be conducted; and with more log files or more details of incidents 
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included in log files, the forensic analysis can then be processed more smoothly. This 
leads to the first major concern in the research of developing new tools for network 
forensic analysis: that is, how to record network incidents effectively so that more details 
of incidents are documented. Additionally, log files within a network are distributed and 
separately maintained at each node. Thus, collecting wanted information from these 
distributed log files is still a challenge. To avoid collecting log files blindly, all these 
distributed log files should report their existence and their contents publically so that the 
process of collecting information throughout the network can be guided. This also leads 
to the second major concern in the research of developing new tools for network forensic 
analysis: that is, how to report and organize the contents of log files efficiently. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
At the end of the previous section, two major concerns of developing new tools for 
network forensic analysis have been set forth. They can be summarized as the concern of 
“incident logging,” and the concern of “log reporting.” In the next sub-sections, these two 
concerns are analyzed, and the central problems of this research are specified. 
1.2.1 Incident Logging 
From the perspective of incident logging, it is necessary to list the components that 
log files should consist of. As previously discussed, network incidents must be logged in 
advance in order to support later forensics analyses; moreover, the details of these 
network incidents should be fully documented. 
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Generally, a network incident includes one or several raw network incidents. In this 
dissertation, a raw network incident refers to a packet delivery described as “at a time and 
a place, a node has (or has not) received (or sent) a packet.” For example, there are two 
nodes, A and B. Node A is going to request a file from node B. Initially, node A sends a 
request packet to node B. Later, node B sends back a reply packet indicating that the file 
is not available. From the view of node A, this network incident, i.e. the incident of a 
failed file request, includes two raw network incidents that occur successively: 
1. At T1 time, and P1 place, node A has sent a request packet. 
2. At T2 time (T2 > T1), and P2 place, node A has received a reply packet. 
By these two raw incidents, the incident of that failed file request has been fully 
described. For these raw incidents, five components are always included. They are time, 
location, node ID, action (receive or send), and packet. In fact, these five components are 
essential to document any incident. With these five components, information related to 
‘when’, ‘where’, ‘who’, ‘what’ of incidents is fully recorded. 
In this research, the component of location is considered, with regards to its 
measurement and expression. Generally, a location can always be identified by the 
distances from some landmarks. For instance, the location of a student can be described 
as 200 yards from the library, 300 yards from the cafeteria and 300 yards from the 
department of CS. In fact, the distance and distance measurement are essential for the 
localization. Mathematically, location is a concept within normed vector spaces [Kol99] 
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in which a norm (or a distance metric) should be given. However, a network topology 
space has its distance metric absent. This implies a problem: that is, without a distance 
metric, the locations of nodes can not be measured within a network topology space.  
Currently, most network designs introduce a distance metric before localizing nodes 
in network topology spaces. Exactly, those designs require additional devices to measure 
the distance or proximity of any two nodes. For example, some designs utilize Global 
Positioning System (GPS) to localize nodes, and require each node to be equipped with a 
GPS receiver. In fact, these GPS-based designs just embed network topology spaces into 
3-dimensional Euclid spaces (or real world). As a result, node localization within the 
network must depend on the GPS system which runs outside of the network. Even more, 
the GPS receivers equipped at nodes also incurs extra expenses. Other designs utilize the 
strength of received signals to estimate the distance that the signal has been transmitted, 
and then to measure the position of nodes. For these signal strength based designs, node 
localization relies on the information that comes from the physical layer, and requires 
physical measurement.  
In this dissertation, the problem of node localization is considered. The possible 
solutions of the problem would work in network topology spaces, without any additional 
device or physical measurement required. Most importantly, the possible solutions are 
sufficient to express the locations of nodes, for supporting the process of incident logging 
and the later process of network forensic analysis. In terms of network traceability, it is 
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not necessary to localize the physical location of each node. Within a network, the 
information of relative positions of these nodes with each other is much important, 
because connections between nodes are the crucial issue for communications, rather than 
physical locations of nodes.  
1.2.2 Log Reporting 
From the perspective of log reporting, all publically reported logs should be 
organized as a distributed database. In this way, log files an investigator is interested in 
would be searched and collected conveniently in order to process the forensic analysis 
over network. As explained in Section 1.1, the attempt to collect all log files from all 
nodes is quite formidable. To collect log files efficiently, all distributed log files must be 
publically reported and sorted before the forensic analysis is conducted.  
Currently, Distributed Hash Table (DHT) is a popular technology to publish and 
organize distributed resources. Many DHT designs are proposed, such as CAN [Rat01], 
Chord [Sto01], Pastry [Row01, May02], Tapestry [Zha03], etc. Likewise, log files among 
different nodes can also be viewed as distributed resources, and can subsequently be 
published and organized by following these DHT designs.  
However, DHT cannot be directly deployed to publish (or publically report) log files. 
According to the DHT designs, a node should publish its log files (or resources) by 
sending out a special packet (called a publishing packet) to a pre-selected node that is 
determined by the DHT architecture. Nevertheless, delivering the publishing packet over 
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the network is also a new (raw) network incident, and should be logged at intermediate 
(or relay) nodes along the packet’s delivery path. This new log incurred by the publishing 
packet delivery still needs to be published, and another publishing packet corresponding 
to this new log would be issued subsequently. As a result, the publishing process will be 
invoked recursively and endlessly, and publishing packets will finally jam the whole 
network.  
In this dissertation, the problem of this recursive process is considered. The possible 
solution should stop these recursive processes, and the overhead cost of the solution 
should be reasonable. In addition, the communication cost of the publishing process also 
needs to be lessened. In summary, this research incorporates two specified problems, 
which are 1) localizing nodes in network topology spaces without distance metric; and 2) 
publically reporting and organizing these distributed log files economically. 
1.3 The Dissertation Goal 
The goal of this research is to establish a framework to support network forensic 
analysis over mobile networks. This framework includes two parts. 
1) The first part focuses on designing the mechanism of incident logging, which runs 
at different nodes but generates consistent log files. Specifically, the information included 
in these log files should meet the requirements of a general forensic analysis. 
2) The second part addresses the problems of publically reporting these log files. It 
should be noted that these log files are distributed among different nodes. Specifically, 
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the outputs of the reporting must cooperate with any potential search regarding an actual 
forensic analysis. 
The purpose of this study is to create tools and algorithms, with regards to supporting 
forensic analysis over mobile networks. The tools and algorithms should not only support, 
but also facilitate forensic activities at a reasonable cost under ad hoc or infrastructure 
based circumstances. 
1.4 Significance and Originality 
Node localization is examined in this dissertation in order to accurately document 
where network incidents occurred, as is log reporting aimed at tracing network incidents 
conveniently. Compared with previous work, a framework in the research of supporting 
network forensic analysis is founded, and all current designs regarding network forensics 
can be incorporated under this framework. This research is essential to support network 
forensics, network traceability or network accountability over mobile networks, as well 
as to strengthen the security of mobile networks.  
Most importantly, a framework for supporting network forensics is initiated. Under 
the framework, some crucial problems are also inspected and solved. 
1.5 Methodology 
Based on modern technologies and research models in mobile networks, a theoretical 
framework has been established. However, because of the wide coverage of establishing 
this framework, research issues from the different fields (such as Authentication, 
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Distributed Hash Table, etc.) must be taken into account. Moreover, due to the differences 
of these research issues, research methods are different from case to case. In this section, 
a general research path of this work is briefly described. 
This research utilizes multiple methods that are popular in the field of network 
design, such as modeling, theoretical analysis, theoretical calculation, mechanism design, 
and simulation.  
For the modeling, the research object (i.e. mobile networks) is formulated, in relation 
to the research problem concerned. Some key aspects of the object should be emphasized 
in the model, and some other aspects of the object should be ignored in order to simplify 
the model.  
After the modeling are theoretical analyses and calculations. In the phase of 
theoretical analysis, the research problems are inspected thoroughly; however, it would 
be difficult for the theoretical analysis to be completed with a general solution (due to the 
dynamic topology and other complexities of mobile networks). Therefore, the analysis is 
mainly devoted to seeking the solutions of the worst scenarios. In addition, the theoretical 
analysis is aided by theoretical calculation. After the theoretical analysis and calculation, 
rules and criteria are provided. Those rules and criteria can be utilized to guide network 
design over mobile networks. 
Lastly, simulations are conducted to empirically evaluate the result of theoretical 
analyses. The algorithms and mechanisms are implemented or customized in network 
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simulators. The objective of simulations is also to measure the performance of the 
designed mechanisms.  
1.6 Targeted Applications 
All results of this research can be used for logging network incidents and reporting 
log files over mobile networks. For logging incident, these documented incidents can also 
be explored to examine node’s identity. For reporting log, the optimized reporting process 
can also be applied to maintain distributed databases. 
In addition, Location Management system of cellular networks has been extended to 
track the movement of mobile subscribers, especially to quickly trace the movement of 
criminal subscribers. Moreover, the system of Location Management has been optimized 
in order to reduce the cost of location registration. Also, technologies of in-network 
processing are studied in wireless sensor networks, and innovative mechanisms are 
designed to decrease the cost of reporting physical incidents observed by sensor nodes. 
Overall, results of this research mainly developed over mobile networks can also be 
applied to other network circumstances, since mobile networks are only considered as a 
research model rather than as actual networks.  
1.7 Scope of the Study 
In this dissertation, the issues of supporting network forensic analysis are researched 
over mobile networks. As presented previously, log files are principal materials on which 
a network forensic analyst works. Therefore, issues related to log files are thoroughly 
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studied. Briefly, this study is extended to two aspects: 1). inside log files, how to generate 
effective log files is examined; 2). outside log files, how to efficiently report log files is 
examined. 
In respect to generating log files, two components of log files are considered. These 
components are: time and location, which identify “when” and “where” the network 
incident occurs. In the dissertation, the discussion of location is covered, and the 
discussion of time can be found in [Zha07].  
In respect to reporting log file, the emphasis focuses on improving current P2P 
technologies of resource publishing. Our improvements implant DHT technology onto 
log reporting over mobile networks. Also, the improvements optimize the process of 
location registration as well as movement tracing in cellular mobile networks. Again, the 
problem of reporting physical incident is researched in wireless sensor networks. 
1.8 Organization of the Dissertation 
The remaining chapters are organized as follows: In Chapter 2, an overview covers 
the research work related to issues that would be further discussed and extended in the 
following chapters. After the related work, the research efforts of supporting network 
forensic analysis focuses on the two major concerns, which are incident logging and 
incident reporting (or log reporting).  
First, the incident logging is taken into account, because it is the starting point of 
supporting network forensics. In Chapter 3, one key component of incident logging, i.e. 
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location, is discussed. The chapter introduces ‘Background’ to label nodes’ locations. In 
terms of forensic analysis, ‘Background’ is sufficient to be an alternative of the 
component of location in log files. More important, Background does not require a 
distance metric. In the chapter, ‘Background’ is even applied to the process of node 
authentication.  
The other major concern, i.e. log (or incident) reporting, is considered in Chapter 4. 
The issues of incident reporting are discussed in a general model of IP-based mobile 
networks. In the chapter, distributed log files are organized under a typical DHT 
architecture. Moreover, a mechanism has been designed to limit the communication cost 
of incident reporting.  
After the discussion over a general reporting process, the study is specified and 
concentrated on the most popular mobile networks, i.e. cellular mobile networks. In 
Chapter 5, the discussion is dedicated to location reporting (or registration), and aimed at 
tracing the criminal’s movement quickly (which is a specific forensic activity) in cellular 
mobile networks. Meanwhile, the cumulative cost of location registration is optimized, in 
order to obtain better performance.  
In Chapter 6, the context of the study changes to wireless sensor networks, which is 
also popular networks of the current research. Especially, wireless sensor networks can be 
used to monitor physical objects, and report physical incidents which are much helpful on 
network forensics. In the chapter, the technology of “in-networking process” is extended. 
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According to the extension, physical signal fields are explored to report incidents (or 
sensory data) to sink nodes of wireless sensor networks. In this way, the communication 
cost of the reporting process would be reduced.  
Finally, in Chapter 7, a summary of the research is presented and a prospective of 
future work is considered. 
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Chapter 2 Related Work 
Current research of network forensic support, regardless of whether it is on fixed 
networks or on mobile networks, often focuses on defending against some particular 
types of network attacks, such as denial-of-service attacks, stepping stone attacks 
[Aad04], identity spoof [Kuz03], jellyfish attacks [Lee01], shrew attacks [Pax01], etc.. 
Since these solutions and research models are aimed at one or two attack types, solutions 
and research models can be quite different from each other. In this chapter, the different 
solutions and research efforts from different fields are covered, in order to 
comprehensively present the current research status of network forensic support.  
As was discussed in the previous chapter, log files are the principal materials of 
network forensics. Research work on forensic support services should still be related to 
generating, storing, sorting, publishing, and delivering log files. This research focuses on 
the processes of generating and publishing log files. In the following discussions, these 
two processes are formatted as incident logging and log publishing. In this chapter, recent 
developments and ongoing work about incident logging and log publishing are reviewed 
and thoroughly examined. This is essential for any network design towards forensic 
support services.  
This chapter includes two sections: “incident logging” and “log publishing.” In the 
section of incident logging, the location of a node and its related applications are 
reviewed. These related applications include the issues of node localization, identification 
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and authentication. By following the discussion of Chapter 1, the location of a node, a 
crucial component of logging network incidents, can authenticate the node’s identity. 
Thereafter, current authentication designs over mobile networks are summarized. 
In the next section, log (or incident) publishing is reviewed under three 
circumstances. First, research efforts on an IP-based network are concerned, and results 
about log publishing and attack tracking are presented. Second, the scope of the review 
narrows down to cellular networks. In this circumstance, the designs of location 
publishing (or location registration) are fully inspected. Third, the circumstance changes 
to wireless sensor networks (WSNs), and the latest innovative designs with regard to 
incident publishing (or sensory data publishing) are examined.  
2.1 Incident Logging 
The location of a node is a crucial component to accurately document network 
incidents, and can also be used for the node’s authentication. In this section, modern 
technologies of node localization, identification and authentication are presented. 
Authentication is essential for secure communications, and can be achieved by 
checking something that is related to a node’s identity. Currently, the work concerning 
network authentication depends on key and key management [Mer07], such as a key’s 
generation, exchange, and distribution. For the designs of key-based authentications, two 
scenarios are discussed here.  
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The first scenario relies on a third party authority, which is called certification 
authority (CA). Inside a network, a public key infrastructure is used for data encryption, 
and CA is in charge of public keys distribution. CA can be a centralized system [Zho99, 
Hua03] or a distributed system [Go05, Pir04a, Pir04b, Kon01]. In general, these 
authorities reside within the network. However, these authority nodes must be predefined 
by some privileges which other common nodes do not possess. 
In the second scenario, no authority exists. A client and a server establish their secure 
connection through negotiation [Tse07, Cap06, Pie06, Mer05, Cap03, Put03, Hub01, 
Ven00]. In fact, the second scenario is a special case of the first scenario, because each 
node acts as the authority of itself. However, since each node is the authority of itself, the 
key of each node can then be assigned or selected by the node itself. As a result, 
malicious nodes could change their keys (or identities) arbitrarily without any expense.  
Key-based authentication builds an association between a node’s identity and its 
assigned key. The assigned key is a man-made identifier (or characteristic) of the node, as 
is the case with many other characteristics the node possesses. Based on this key, the 
procedure of authentication is conducted. The node’s identity can be confirmed by 
checking whether its key is correct. In fact, the node’s identity can also be confirmed by 
checking any other characteristic of the node, only if the value of this characteristic is 
unique to the node. In other words, key-based designs are no longer irreplaceable for the 
node authentication. Here, the argument is made that a node’s neighbor list, called a 
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node’s Background, is another feasible choice for node authentication. In addition, the list 
of neighbors, which is a physical characteristic of the node, can be used for many other 
applications, such as incident logging and node identification.  
Accordingly, the authentication strategies can then be classified into two categories. 
The first category includes all these key-based authentication strategies in which an 
authority is always needed, regardless of whether the authority is a central system or a 
distributed system. The strategy designed in this research belongs to the second category, 
in which authorities and keys are not necessary. The identity of the node can be 
confirmed by other characteristics of the node, especially by the node’s physical 
characteristics, e.g. neighbor list. Compared to other characteristics of the node, the 
assigned key is a characteristic that is controlled by an authority. Conversely, the 
neighbor list of the node is a physical characteristic that no node can fully control. 
2.2 Log Publishing 
2.2.1 Log Publishing over General Computer Networks 
Currently, with respect to supporting network forensics, all technologies can be 
grouped into two categories, which are termed “packet marking” and “packet logging”. 
For packet marking, a passing packet may be marked with the node’s ID and a time 
stamp. Also, the node may log each passing packet along with a time stamp, which is 
called packet logging. In some designs, technologies of packet logging and packet 
marking are even combined [Gon05].  
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For those designs of packet marking [Sav00, Bel03], the marked packets will finally 
be logged at their termination nodes. Thus, both packet marking and packet logging can 
be described uniformly: at a node, a message is generated when a packet arrived. This 
message should include information about the packet’s ID, the node’s ID, and the arrival 
time. For packet logging, the message is logged locally. For packet marking, the message 
should be delivered along with the packet, and logged at the packet’s termination, or it 
can be said that all packet-related logs are published at the packet’s termination. The 
difference between packet logging and packet marking is that for packet logging, the logs 
of a packet arrival are maintained locally; while for packet marking, the logs of a packet 
arrival are delivered to or published at the termination of the packet. 
2.2.1.1 Packet Marking 
In fixed networks, it is common that every second, Gigabytes are delivered over 
backbone links. So, it is impossible for routers along the backbone links to mark every 
passing packet. Besides, a flood attack implies that lots of attack packets will hit the 
victim node along the same routing path, and it is not necessary to mark every attack 
packet at every intermediate node along the attacking path. This situation leads to the 
strategy of probabilistic packet marking (PPM) [Sav00], according to which each router 
only marks passing packets with a low probability. By following PPM, a packet may be 
marked at one or two routers along its delivery path. At the victim node (or the 
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termination node of the packet), the entire delivery path can be reconstructed by 
collecting marks from a group of these partially marked packets.  
A similar idea is also proposed in ICMP trace-back (ITRACE) [Bel03], in which the 
mark field is split from the passing packets and carried by ICMP messages. According to 
ITRACE, when a packet arrives at a router, the router will send an ICMP message out 
with a low probability. In addition, the termination of this ICMP message should be the 
same as that of the packet. The delivery path of the packet can then be reconstructed at 
the termination node by identifying the source nodes of these ICMP messages. 
As is the case of marking packets with low probability, some designs use other data 
compression technologies to record the delivery path on packets. In [Dea02], the mark 
field of each packet is defined with the fixed length, no matter how long the delivery path 
is. The delivery path that the packet passed is compressed hop by hop, and recorded in 
the mark field of the packet. Still, the delivery path of the packet can be recovered by 
collecting marks from numerous packets.  
In other designs, the marks of packets are used for identifying IP spoof before the 
packets reach their terminations [Par01]. Whenever a packet arrives at a node, its source 
address, termination address, and mark field are examined by the node. If the source 
address, the termination address, the marks, and the address of the node itself are along a 
possible routing path from the source to the termination, then the packet is valid. 
Otherwise, the packet is invalid. 
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2.2.1.2 Packet Logging 
Packet logging requires that all passing packets should be logged locally. Because of 
the storage limits and the heavy traffic load, each packet should be hashed before being 
logged at a node. The typical design of packet logging is Source Path Isolation Engine 
(SPIE) [Sno02], in which a Bloom Filter is used for packet hashing. According to SPIE, 
all passing packets should be logged at the node where they arrived. A Bloom Filter is 
deployed for packet hashing, and the output for each packet is a 4 byte data, called packet 
digest. As it is only 4 bytes long, the collision probability of these packet digests is high. 
Therefore, SPIE only keeps recent packet digests, and drops older ones, by using the 
technique of slide window.  
To trace the delivery path of a packet, the termination node of the packet should 
broadcast first. Any node that possesses the related packet digests should reply and 
initiate new broadcasting. This process would be iterated until the source of the packet is 
reached. In the paper [Sno02], the authors argue that the first 28 bytes of each packet (IP 
header plus 8 byte payload) are sufficient to differentiate packets. Therefore, only the first 
28 bytes of each packet are fed in the Bloom Filter. In [Mit02], the passing packets are 
classified first by their source and termination address, before hashing and logging. 
Additionally, different sliding windows are assigned to each packet class to identify 
“recent” packets.  
 24
Some packet logging strategies go even further on log compression. In their designs, 
only some traffic patterns of each link, such as traffic speeds, average packet size, or 
traffic spectrum, are sampled and logged. During the phase of attack tracking, the 
correlations of these logged traffic patterns over different links are examined, and the 
most correlated links are picked to reconstruct the attacking path.  
In [Hus06], the dominant frequency of the traffic is selected as its fingerprint. In 
[Sek04], routers record traffic loads of links. While an attack tracking, the correlations 
between the traffic loads of the current attack and of those records are calculated. The 
attacking path can then be identified by connecting these links with the highest 
correlations.  
A similar strategy also appears in [Xie05]. According to the paper, the path of worm 
propagation spans a graph over a network, and this propagation graph can be identified 
by the strategy of “moonwalk,” which is similar to the trace-back procedure of SPIE. At 
the beginning, the origin graph is a link of the victim node. At each moonwalk step, all 
hosts that contact the graph will have their traffic logs analyzed in terms of causality and 
correlation. The most prospective links, which are with high-level causality and 
correlation, are added to the graph. In [Sek06], the traffic loads are characterized by 
multiple resolutions to obtain better performance. 
In all above designs of packet marking or packet logging, no information has been 
recorded explicitly to indicate the relative position where the node is along the delivery 
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path of packets. This is not a problem for fixed networks, as all nodes are fixed at their 
positions with fixed links. However, since nodes can move arbitrarily in mobile networks, 
the relative position of the node should be logged, along with the time stamp for the later 
investigation.  
In [Hua05], SPIE is extended, and the TTL (time to live) field of each packet is 
explored. In addition to logging the packet digests (through Bloom filter), the design 
requests nodes to log the TTL field of each packet separately. As the TTL value of a 
packet decreases hop by hop along the delivery path, the sequence order of nodes along 
the packet’s delivery path can then be recovered by sorting these logged TTL values. 
However, problems still exist when working with mobile networks. For designs of 
packet logging, all logs are distributed in the network. Hence, it will be difficult to search 
logs that relate to a particular packet delivery. Some strategies, for example of SPIE, 
leverage the static topography of fixed networks, and search logs along the backward 
delivery path hop by hop. In mobile networks, the dynamic topography makes a SPIE 
searching impossible. Efforts of collecting all logs from all nodes can not solve the 
problem, not only because the expense of the log collection is massive, but also because 
the information that is interested would be buried under a multitude of unrelated logs.  
For the designs of packet marking, logs related to a particular packet delivery are 
forwarded (or published) to the packet’s termination, which seems much easier for the log 
collection and the forensic analysis. Nevertheless, the termination node is more likely to 
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be a victim under attacks. As a result, the termination nodes are more likely to be 
compromised, and log files of the termination nodes would be tampered with or even 
erased thoroughly. Thus, the results of forensic analysis that solely rely on logs from the 
victim nodes are questionable. 
2.2.2 Location Publishing over Cellular Networks 
Over a GSM network, the current location of a mobile subscriber can always be 
traced by referencing its HLR (Home Location Register). According to the standard IS-41, 
the serving VLR should publish its location on the mobile subscriber’s HLR whenever 
the subscriber come in. From the viewpoint of a mobile subscriber, its HLR is fixed at 
somewhere inside the GSM network, and its VLRs (Visitor Location Register) are 
scattered in the network. When the subscriber moves into a new location, it should 
register on the local VLR first. After the registration, the local VLR gets to know where 
the subscriber’s HLR is, and then publishes (registers, updates) the subscriber’s current 
location on the HLR. Thereafter, the movement tracking of the mobile subscriber can be 
conducted by simply referencing the log files of the subscriber’s HLR.  
However, the process of location publishing would be costly if the subscriber moves 
far away from its HLR and changes its location frequently. For the movement tracking, it 
would seem a waste that the investigator keeps referencing the HLR continuously. Many 
innovative strategies have been developed to reduce cost as well as to support movement 
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tracking over GSM networks. These strategies are focused on optimizing the procedure of 
location publishing.  
In the mid-1990s, the concept “anchor” was introduced to the procedure of location 
publishing (registration), aimed at reducing the accumulative expense along the moving 
path. From the perspective of a subscriber, any of its VLRs can be selected as its anchor 
only if the selection can reduce the accumulative expense of its location publishing.  
HLR 
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Figure 2-1. Anchor and its update 
When roaming, the subscriber only needs to publish its location on its anchor, 
instead of on its HLR. In [Ho95], an anchor is inserted between HLR and the serving 
VLR. This design partially follows the standard IS-41 when a call arrives at the 
subscriber. When the subscriber receives a call, the current location (indicated by the 
routing number) of the serving VLR will publish on its HLR directly, and the serving 
 28
VLR becomes the anchor of the subscriber (the VLR and MSC are exchangeable in this 
instance). When the subscriber moves into a new location, there are two options to update 
its anchor. As shown in Figure 2-1, one option is to select the new serving VLR as the 
anchor. The other option is to keep the original anchor without change. The new serving 
VLR decides which anchor to select, by taking the current publishing/binding expense 
and call arrival rate into account. 
A similar design has also been developed in the circumstance of inter-network 
roaming [Wan01]. In [Kal99, Vee97], routing tables are also referenced for the anchor 
update. In [Li04], the subscriber’s anchor should be selected from other subscribers’ 
HLRs. In [Rat00], the concepts of VLR and HLR are mixed together and called 
“Location Register (LR).” In this way, regardless of whether it is HLR or VLR, any one 
(LR) can be selected as a subscriber’s anchor. Above all, strategies only select one anchor 
for each mobile subscriber. 
Other techniques, such as “terminal caching” and “built-in timer” are also combined 
with the technology of anchor [Hai01, Hai02, Zho01], regarding the subscriber’s location 
publishing. In these designs, a subscriber is enhanced with a built-in memory [Hai01, 
Hai02] to cache the address of its anchor. When the subscriber moves to a new location 
served by a new VLR, this new VLR queries the subscriber about the address of its 
anchor and then binds to the anchor. A built-in timer is also used for optimizing the 
procedure of location publishing [Zho01]. Whenever a built-in timer exceeds its 
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(pre-defined) threshold, the subscriber will initiate a location publishing, regardless of 
whether it has moved or not since the last location publishing. With the threshold of the 
timer carefully defined, the publishing expense could be reduced significantly with an 
acceptable probability of call blocking and movement tracking. 
HLR 
Mobile Terminal 
Anchor Chain 
Serving VLR
VLR VLR 
Anchor c Anchor d 
 
Figure 2-2. Anchor chain 
As shown in Figure 2-2, more anchors are introduced in the process of location 
publishing [Bej03], and all these anchors are connected to form a chain. In this way, the 
movement tracking would be conducted by searching along the chain. Anchors are 
selected from the VLRs that the mobile subscriber visited, and updated based on the 
distance between the pair of neighbor anchors. In the worst cases, this design can 
guarantee that a subscriber’s accumulative expense of location publishing/binding be 
with the order of O(M·logM). Here, M is the distance that the subscriber has moved. In 
[Mao04], 2-tier architecture of HLR-VLR has been extended to 3-tier architecture, in 
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which a new tier is inserted between HLR and VLR. In fact, this new tier simply 
functions as an anchor. Likewise, more tiers are even defined inside the mobile IP 
network [Ma04] to reduce the expense of location publishing.  
Overall, the expense of location publishing can be reduced by inserting anchors 
between HLR and the subscriber’s serving VLR. Meanwhile, the moving path of a 
subscriber can still be traced by referencing its HLR and all its anchors. In this 
dissertation, the author follows the design of anchor chain proposed by [Bej03], and 
develops an optimization criterion of chain update. In the worst cases, the subscriber’s 
accumulative expense of location publishing is with the order of O(M). Here, M is still 
the distance the subscriber has moved.  
2.2.3 Physical Incident Publishing over Wireless Sensor Networks 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of spatially distributed sensor nodes. By 
collecting sensory data from these distributed sensor nodes, WSNs can monitor physical 
conditions (i.e. sound, motion, temperature, and pollutants) at different locations 
automatically. In general, the gateway node of a WSN is called a sink node. Sensor nodes 
with sensory data are called source nodes. From the perspective of source nodes, the 
sensory data, implying the occurrence of incidents, should be published on the sink nodes. 
Thus, the data collection of WSNs is a variation of incident publishing. 
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2.2.3.1 WSN Clustering 
To gain energy efficiency, sensory data should be aggregated locally. This is called 
in-network processing. Mostly, source nodes are far away from the sink node, so it would 
be costly if sensory data from source nodes are delivered to the sink node individually. 
In-network processing is to drive these sensory data to converge to some local nodes and 
aggregate these sensory data there. Only aggregated data would be sent to the sink node. 
In this way, the total energy expense of data delivery (or incident publishing) may drop 
substantially. As shown in Figure 2-3, sensory data are converged to node A, and 
aggregated there. The aggregated data would then be delivered to the sink node directly. 
 
Figure 2-3. In-network processing of WSN 
However, source nodes may be scattered among a WSN randomly. Some source 
nodes may be close to each other, and others may be far away from each other. It is clear 
sink 
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that only those source nodes that are close to each other should be clustered together for 
in-network processing. If source nodes are far away from each other, in-network 
processing is of no benefit. Therefore, in-network processing should only run inside each 
local cluster. Nevertheless, how a WSN can be separated into several clusters is still a 
problem that needs to be solved.  
Most schemes simply cluster sensor nodes by their locations, regardless of whether 
these nodes are source nodes or not. Some schemes [Ye02, Sha05] divide the network 
area (or the monitoring area) into square patches when the network is constructed, and 
each patch corresponds to a cluster. In [Sto05], a localization system is deployed over 
WSNs. In their design, a spotlight device (a localization-related hardware) is installed at 
an actuator. The spotlight device steers a laser light to measure the location of a node, and 
then informs the node of the measurement result. After that, sensor nodes can be clustered 
by their measured locations. The drawback of this clustering scheme is that it depends on 
a reference (a spotlight device) outside the WSN.  
Training Protocol is an innovative design on node clustering [Wad05]. In a WSN, 
two sensor nodes are selected to initiate a training process. During the training process, 
each of those two nodes establishes the shortest routing path tree around itself. After the 
training process, every sensor node should maintain two numbers, which are hop counts 
to those two selected sensor nodes. In fact, these two numbers (hop counts) can be used 
as location coordinates of the node. The nodes with the “similar” coordinates are grouped 
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together to form a cluster. Among these clustering designs, a cluster header should be 
selected inside each cluster. The cluster header can be elected or be predefined within the 
cluster. Inside a cluster, sensory data converge to the cluster header for in-network 
aggregation.  
Some other designs cluster nodes by the routing paths towards the sink node, For 
example, the shortest routing path tree of the sink node [Kri02] is explored for the node 
clustering. According to this design, sensor nodes that locate at the same branch are 
clustered together. Along the delivery path, sensory data from source nodes that are far 
from the sink node may pass by some other source nodes near the sink node. As a result, 
sensory data can be aggregated along their way.  
Also, node clustering can adapt to environmental conditions. There are some designs 
that cluster WSNs by the intensity of the sensing signal. In these designs, sensor nodes 
are clustered by the boundary of the physical incident that WSN is monitoring. In this 
way, node clusters are associated with the locations of physical incidents. The boundary 
of a node cluster is identified by the signal amplitude sensed by sensor nodes (i.e. 
physical signal intensity). If the amplitude of sensed signal is lower than the threshold, 
the node must be outside a cluster. Within a node cluster, the cluster header is still elected 
by the amplitude of sensed signal, and the node with the highest amplitude would win 
[Fan03]. A similar election mechanism is also described in GRAB [Ye02], in which the 
node of “center of signal” (CoS) is elected by the strength of sensed signal. Furthermore, 
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only the sensory data from the node of CoS has been required to be delivered to the sink 
node. 
2.2.3.2 WSN Routing 
Most routing schemes over WSNs include in-network processing, in order to publish 
sensory data (or incidents) to the sink node efficiently [Kri02, Ye02, Sha04, Bea03a, 
Bea03b, Shi05, Sha05]. In [Kri02], three routing schemes, relative to the energy expense 
and the time delay, are proposed. The first routing scheme is named “Center at Nearest 
Source (CNS).” According to the scheme of CNS, a sensor node can be selected as the 
cluster header, only if the node is within the cluster and nearest to the sink. The second 
routing scheme is “Shortest Paths Tree (SPT).” According to the scheme, sensory data are 
delivered along the shortest routing path tree of the sink node, and can be aggregated on 
their way. The third one, “Greedy Incremental Tree (GIT),” is an iterative scheme that 
runs round by round. At each round, the source node that is nearest to the current routing 
tree is added through the shortest routing path. The routing tree grows round by round, 
until all source nodes are included.  
In [Int03, Bis05], a query packet is diffused from the sink node, in order to probe the 
routing path tree of the sink node. Sensor nodes are activated by the query packet, and 
sensory data (or incidents) are delivered along the reverse path of the query diffusion. In 
addition, sensory data are aggregated along their delivery path. In [Sha04], the data 
sampling is triggered by the timer and by the variation of sensed signal. Similar ideas can 
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also be found in [Bea03a] and [Bea03b]. In [Shi05], a virtual infrastructure, “Rail,” is 
constructed for in-network processing. “Rail” acts as a rendezvous area of sensory data, 
and all data are aggregated within the “Rail.”  
As is the case with the designs of node clustering, the routing paths can also adapt to 
environment conditions. In [Hon04], each node forwards sensory data, based on the 
remaining energy of both itself and its neighbors. In [Gan04], packets of sensory data are 
agent-based. These agent-based packets determine their routing paths hop by hop. 
Whenever an agent-based packet arrives at a node, its agent section will instruct the node 
to calculate its next delivery stop, based on the remaining energy of the node and the 
transmission expense of the next hop.  
Local target protocol (LTP) [Cha05] could help sensory data packets detour concave 
holes of WSNs. During the “search phase” of LTP, the node locates its neighbors that are 
closer to the sink, and the utmost neighbor is selected. During the “direct transmission 
phase” of LTP, the sensory data packet is sent to this utmost neighbor. If no neighbor is 
closer to the sink than the node itself during the “search phase,” and the sensory data 
packet has not arrived the sink node, the “backtrack phase” is invoked. During the phase, 
the data packet is sent back to the node where it came from. 
Overall, the technology of in-network processing can greatly reduce the expense of 
sensory data publishing (or incident publishing). With WSNs clustered, in-network 
processing can be conducted. Currently, there are three types of schemes regarding node 
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clustering. They are pre-defined clustering, routing path clustering and signal amplitude 
clustering. For the routing scheme, the issue of “routing within a cluster” is rarely 
discussed. In the dissertation, the author follows the schemes of signal amplitude 
clustering and proposes a routing scheme that can not only work within clusters for 
in-network processing, but also smoothly collaborate with existing global routing 
schemes.  
Summary 
Towards network forensic support, the discussions are separated into two parts, i.e. 
incident logging and incident publishing. For incident logging, location is one of the key 
components to accurately record happenings. Thus, research efforts related to the location 
and its application (i.e. node authentication) are inspected. Afterward, the issue of 
incident publishing is discussed under three different circumstances (i.e. general mobile 
networks, cellular networks and wireless sensor networks). Research efforts presented 
mainly focus on decreasing the communication cost of incident publishing. 
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Chapter 3 Localization and Authentication in Network Topology Spaces 
In order to support network forensic, the log file and the logging mechanism must be 
researched firstly, because they are the bases of any forensic analysis. In this chapter, the 
research of incident logging is focused on the location and one of its applications (i.e. 
node authentication). The research is conducted over a typical model of mobile ad hoc 
networks. The objective of the research is to provide a solution to localize mobile nodes 
in a network topology space. Meanwhile, the solution of node localization is leveraged 
across the process of node authentication, aimed at defending the attack of node ID spoof. 
3.1 Problem Description 
In general, a Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) consists of a group of mobile nodes 
which can communicate with others via a wireless channel. To be an open system, a 
MANET requires that all nodes be able to join or leave the network freely. However, this 
is problematic in terms of MANET security because malicious nodes can join MANET 
freely and anonymously. Inside a MANET, the malicious nodes can jam wireless 
channels by flooding useless packets, or just shuffling/dropping passing packets that 
should be forwarded in an orderly fashion. Also, a malicious node may disguise its ID, 
and abuse services that are provided by the MANET without penalty. 
In this chapter, a type of attack — node ID spoof is addressed, and the solution to this 
attack is presented. This solution differs from other strategies that rely on keys and key 
management systems. That is, every node joins a MANET with a unique ID number, as is 
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the case with a person’s name that can be used to identify whom the person is. However, 
a malicious node may change its ID after a while to avoid the penalty of misbehaving. In 
addition, there is almost no expense for a node to change its ID number because of the ad 
hoc property that MANETs possess, even though this constitutes a certain abuse of the 
MANET’s freedom. By spoofing its identity, a malicious node may also apply services 
that are provided by other nodes and create chaos without a penalty. In this instance, a 
mechanism to make every node (and its behaviors) accountable, responsible, and 
traceable is presented. Under this mechanism, a process of node authentication has also 
been designed for service supplies. 
3.2 High Level Solution Description 
The mechanism requires that each node of a MANET one-hop broadcast its current 
background information (neighbor list) periodically. An example is useful to illustrate this 
mechanism. A person lives in a community, which is similar to a node in a MANET. The 
person is named Tom, just like a node with its ID number. Moreover, Tom also has 
background information, such as which high school he graduated from, whom his parents 
are, and where his home-town is located. Based on Tom’s background information, it is 
always possible to identify him, regardless of whether his name is still Tom or it is 
changed to Jerry.  
For a mobile node of a MANET, its neighbors during a time period can be viewed as 
its background information at that time. To be recognized or identified by other nodes, 
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the node should not only maintain its background information (neighbor list) during the 
time by itself, but should also distribute copies of its background (neighbor list) to other 
nodes. This is similar to a case in which someone states that he knows someone else due 
to the fact that he knows the person’s name as well as other basic information of the 
person, such as the appearance, the friends and the place the person often to hang around. 
By broadcasting its background information (neighbor list), a node, which intends to 
spoof its identity later, also needs to spoof those distributed background copies. However, 
changing the background copies maintained by other nodes is somewhat complex. As a 
result, the expense of ID spoofing increases. 
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Figure 3-1. A special case when nodes are with same neighbors 
There is a special case as shown in Figure 3-1. In this case, node A and node C are 
with same neighbors, and so, node C has a chance to impersonate node A by simply 
changing its own ID. Based on Figure 3-1, any person can easily identify the fact that 
node A and node C are with same neighbors.  
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However, this figure is not available to node C immediately. In fact, when node C is 
outside of the broadcasting range of node A, it cannot know the neighbor list of node A. 
In order to get information of neighbors surrounding node A, node C must move within 
the broadcasting area of node A and eavesdrop, and consequently cause the topography 
changed.  
It is true that node C may still impersonate node A, or our design would still possibly 
be hacked. For example, node C may move into the broadcasting area of node A, and 
silently eavesdrop the background broadcasting from node A. After that, node C moves 
out of the broadcasting area of A, and to the position shown in Figure 3-1. In such a case, 
node C can mimic node A for a while with same background, until the relative position 
between node A and node B, D, E varies. This is a limitation of our design, and would be 
researched further in the future work. 
In addition, node C may collaborate with node B (or D, or E), in order to get the 
neighbor list of node A and impersonate node A. During the collaboration, node B may 
receive the broadcasted neighbor list from node A, and informed node C secretly. 
Because of the limit of this research, these collaborations among malicious nodes would 
not be considered. Also, node C may obtain the neighbor list of node A through some 
special capability that other normal nodes don’t possess. In this dissertation, we assume 
that most nodes are honest and reliable to follow our background broadcasting design, 
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and all nodes are with same capability. In addition, malicious nodes cannot collaborate 
with each other.  
Specifically, each node should broadcast its ID and its current neighbor list (a set of 
ID numbers) periodically. In the mean time, each node should maintain a background 
table, based on the received background packets. The background table of a node should 
include the node’s self-background (including all neighboring IDs which are one-hop 
from the node), and its neighbor’s background (which are one-hop from this neighbor). 
The node’s background table should be logged periodically along with time stamps. 
Whenever the node needs a service, the service provider (another node) requests the node 
to submit its background (neighbor list) at a particular time point. Based on the node’s 
response, the node’s neighbors at that time will be referenced to check whether the node’s 
response is correct or not. In this way, any intended ID spoofing can be identified. 
The outline of the chapter is as follows: Section 3.3 presents the mechanism of the 
background construction and the background table maintenance; Section 3.4 describes 
the procedure of the node authentication based on background checks; Section 3.5 
investigates the overhead incurred by the designed mechanism. 
3.3 Constructing the Background of Nodes 
3.3.1 The Model 
This chapter follows a commonly accepted MANET model. That is, a group of 
mobile nodes construct a multi-hop mesh network via its wireless radio. Whenever a 
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node joins MANET, it should select a unique number to be its node ID. This can be 
achieved by following a similar mechanism to that of the Global Unique Identifier 
(GUID). It is assumed that all selected node IDs are evenly distributed in their namespace. 
After selecting the node ID, the node should take part in a periodic process of background 
broadcasting, which will be discussed in sub-section 3.3.2. Before the node leaves the 
MANET, it does not need to announce its departure. In addition, it is assumed that the 
storage space of each node is enough for incidents logging, and all participating nodes are 
time synchronized. 
3.3.2 Background Broadcasting 
Each node should broadcast its node ID and its current background (neighbor list) 
periodically. The time interval of background broadcastings depends on the nodes’ 
average mobile intensity, the node density, and traffic loads. The size of the background 
broadcasting packet corresponds to the node density of the MANET. For example, each 
broadcasting area covers 30 nodes. Since each GUID needs 16 bytes, the size of the 
MANET’s background broadcasting packets may be around 512 bytes long. A 
background broadcasting packet should include sections to carry these node IDs and a 
time stamp. Within a background broadcasting packet, the node’s ID, from which the 
packet is broadcasted, is called the index ID. In this instance, only the packet format of 
the application layer is taken into account. When a node receives a background 
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broadcasting packet, the information carried by the packet should be integrated into the 
“background table” (sub-section 3.3.3) that is maintained by the node. 
3.3.3 Background Table Maintenance 
Each node should maintain a table, based on the arrived background broadcasting 
packets. In addition, the table at each node should be logged with a time stamp when a 
new background broadcasting packet generates at the node. At each node, the background 
table should be indexed by all its neighbors’ node IDs, and each entry of the background 
table is a list of all neighbors of the index node. For example, a MANET consists of five 
mobile nodes, and its current topography is shown in Figure 3-3. 
A B C D 
E 
G 
F 
 
Figure 3-2. A MANET example for background table construction 
The current background table at node B is shown in Table 3-1. The left-hand column 
of the table contains index nodes which are all neighbor node IDs of node B. The 
right-hand column of the table contains all node IDs of neighbors of each index node. 
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From topography shown in Figure 3-3, it is evident that node A, C, E, and F are neighbor 
nodes of node B, and they are all listed in the left-hand column of Table 3-1.  
Table 3-1. Background table at node B 
A B, E 
C B, D, F, G 
E B, A 
F B, C 
Node A has two neighbor nodes, node B and node E. Thus, for the row of node A in 
Table 3-1, nodes B and E are listed in the right cell. From Figure 3-3, nodes B, D, F, and 
G are neighbors of node C. Therefore, nodes B, D, F, and G are listed in the right-hand 
column corresponding to node C. Similarly, the other two cells that are indexed by nodes 
E and F can be filled in as well. A row of the background table should be updated when a 
background broadcasting packet is received. For example, node B receives a background 
broadcasting packet. The index node ID of this packet is node E, and the neighbor list 
carried by this packet includes nodes B and G. Node B should update its background table 
by filling B and G into the cell indexed by E. The updated table is shown in Table 3-2.  
Table 3-2. Updated background table at node B 
A B, E 
C B, D, F, G 
E B, G 
F B, C 
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From the above example of the background table update, it is evident that a 
background broadcasting packet only updates one row of the table. In addition, each row 
of the table is associated with a time stamp, which may expire after two or three 
broadcasting intervals. The row should be deleted when it is expired. Whenever a 
background broadcasting packet is received, the corresponding row of the table should 
also have its associated time stamp updated by the time stamp of the packet. When a 
background broadcasting packet is received and its index node ID is new to the 
background table, a new row will be added to the background table. The index of this 
new row should be the index node ID of the received background broadcasting packet, 
and all neighbor node IDs carried by the packet should be filled in the right column for 
this new row.  
3.3.4 Mathematics behind the Background Broadcasting  
All nodes of a MANET construct the set F={all nodes of the MANET}. For any 
node with its node ID “x,” a topology space can be generated as Tx = { 0, {x}, {all x’s 
neighbors, x}, F }. For the first three items of Tx, 0 denotes the empty set; {x} denotes 
the set that only node x is included in; {all x’s neighbors, x} denotes the set that node x, 
together with all its neighbors are included in. Here, the node x is the core node of the 
topology space Tx. In fact, this kind of topology space can be generated at each node of 
the MANET. For all of the topology spaces of different nodes, the first item “0” and the 
fourth item “F” are the same. These topology spaces can differentiate from each other by 
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the second item (for Tx is {x}) and the third item (for Tx is {all x’s neighbors, x}). To 
measure the distance between each pair of the different topology spaces, we map these 
two items onto two vectors in the N-dimension space RN. Here, N is the total number of 
nodes in the MANET. For the vector space RN, each dimension corresponds to a node of 
the network. The coordinates of the vectors are coded by “1” or “0”, in order to represent 
the corresponding node is or is not included. 
For example, the topography of a network is shown in Figure 3-3. The topology 
space generated at node B: TB = { 0, {B}, {A, B, C, E}, {A, B, C, D, E} }. Totally, there 
are five nodes in the network, and so a five-dimension vector space is used for the 
mapping. For this five-dimension vector space, let the first dimension corresponds to 
node A; the second dimension corresponds to node B; the third dimension corresponds to 
node C; the fourth dimension corresponds to node D; and the fifth dimension corresponds 
to node E. Therefore, the second item of TB, {B}, is mapped onto the vector [ 0 1 0 0 0 ]T, 
as only node B is included. Similarly, the third item of TB, {A, B, C, E}, is mapped onto 
the vector [ 1 1 1 0 1]T, as in this case, only node D is not included. 
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Figure 3-3. An example of network topography 
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Before the mapping, all nodes are sorted by their IDs and correspond to entries of the 
vectors from top to bottom (or from left to right if the vector is transposed). In this 
example, the first entry of the vector corresponds to node A, the second entry of the 
vector corresponds to node B, and so on. In addition, the first vector corresponds to the 
second item “{B}” of the space TB, and the second vector corresponds to the third item 
“{A, B, C, E}” of the space TB. If the node ID is included in the item of the topology 
space, the corresponding entry of the vector is set to be 1. Otherwise, the corresponding 
entry of the vector is set to be 0.  
Following the example above, the second item of TB is {B}, which is mapped onto 
the five-dimension vector [ 0 1 0 0 0 ]T. The argument behind this mapping is that only 
node B is included in the item of TB, and only the second entry of the vector is set to be 1. 
The third item of TB is {A, B, C, E}, which is mapped to the five-dimension vector [ 1 1 1 
0 1]T. The argument behind this mapping is that only node D is not included in the item 
of TB. So, only the fourth entry of the vector is set to be 0, and all the rest entries are set 
to be 1. In this way, the space TB is represented by these two vectors. 
The benefit of using vectors to represent a topology space is that the distance 
between different topology spaces can be measured by the inner product of vectors. 
Moreover, the distance between any two topology spaces may represent the distance of 
the core nodes of those two spaces in a network circumstance. As a result, these two 
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vectors can be used for localizing core nodes in a network topology space; even through 
the concept of the distance metric has not been introduced in the network topology space. 
3.3.5 Security Issues on Background Broadcasting 
Malicious nodes can join MANETs any time, and it cannot be assumed that those 
malicious nodes follow the proposed mechanisms. However, a malicious node can only 
affect the node’s neighbors, and can do nothing about a node which is far from the 
malicious node. Overall, most nodes are normal in a MANET, and the percentage of 
malicious nodes should be less than 1. Nevertheless, the proposed mechanism of 
background broadcasting can still be hacked; however, the influence of this hack is 
confined to the local area. 
3.4 Authentication 
3.4.1 Background Authentication 
Since a MANET is an open system, services given over a MANET should be 
accessed by any honest MANET member (node). For example, if there are two nodes, X 
and Y, node X is going to access a service provided by node Y. In this case, node X should 
send an application message to node Y first. After that, node Y requests node X to submit 
its neighbor list at a particular time point (say t). When node X receives the request, node 
X should extract its neighbor list at time t from its log files. This neighbor list includes all 
node IDs in the left-hand column of node X’s “background table” at time t. If node X just 
joins the MANET and has no history log at time t, the service requests from node X 
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should be declined. If the submitted neighbor list only includes four or fewer node IDs, 
node Y also needs to decline the service requests from node X. 
Whenever node Y gets the neighbor list of node X at time t, a background check starts. 
Node Y selects 3~10 node IDs from the submitted neighbor list as node X’s references, 
and sends the neighbor list, together with X’s node ID and time t, to each of node X’s 
references. Each reference of node X only needs to reply “correct” or “not correct,” by 
checking the received list with the log file of itself. If more than 80% (or 90%) of the 
replies from node X’s references are “correct,” node Y should approve node X’s service 
application. Otherwise, node Y should decline node X’s service application. Here, all 
numbers in the above descriptions, such as 3~10 node IDs and 80% (or 90%), can be 
adjusted and optimized in practice. 
3.4.2 Mathematics behind Background Authentication  
The neighbor list from node X is used to construct the two vectors of the topology 
space TX. At a reference node of node X, the 1st and 2nd vector of TX (named R1X and R2X, 
respectively) can be generated from the received neighbor list of node X. After that, the 
reference node uses R1X to search for the logged neighbor list of node X. Based on the 
logged neighbor list of node X, the reference node constructs the 2nd vector of TX again 
(named L2X). Normalized inner product between the vector R2X and L2X is calculated and 
compared with a threshold to identify whether the received neighbor list is correct or not.  
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For example, the Figure 3-3 shows a MANET. Node B has its background checked. 
By the neighbor list from node B, we have R2B = [1 1 1 0 1]T. Assuming that at the 
reference node A, L2B = [1 1 0 0 1]T, the normalized inner product is  
BB
BB
RL
LR
22
22 ,
⋅ = 23 = 0.866.  (3-E1) 
If the given threshold is set to be 0.85, the node A should reply “correct.” The 
difference between R2B and L2B may be caused by the nodes’ movements and/or noise. In 
this example, the threshold is set to be 0.85 arbitrarily. In practice, the threshold can be 
generated by statistics, based on different moving patterns of nodes and noise.  
3.4.3 Recursive Background Authentication  
In fact, the reference nodes can be questioned as well. After a reference node replies 
the background check of node X, node Y can even ask this reference node to submit its 
neighbor list at another particular time point t2. In this way, “Background authentication” 
can be incurred recursively. As a result, the possibility of multiple malicious nodes 
cooperating with each other to cheat can be repressed. 
3.5 Simulation 
In this section, the effects of background broadcasting on the communication traffic 
are investigated, coupling with the change of node density and mobile intensity. The 
effects are measured by the delivery delay and the packet delivery ratio. In the simulation, 
it is assumed that the interval of background broadcastings is three seconds. This time 
interval of background broadcasting comes from the fact that mostly, five meter per 
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second is the upper bound of node’s moving speed, and the transmission radius of the 
broadcasting is about two hundred fifty meters. 
3.5.1 Simulation Model 
Simulations are conducted on an NS-2 simulator. The bandwidth of wireless channels 
is set to be 11Mb/sec; the broadcast radius of each node is set to be 250m. The network 
area of all simulations is 1000m × 1000m. Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
is selected as the routing protocol. Two applications, CBR (Constant Bit-Rate) and FTP 
(File Transport Protocol), are used to mimic traffic loads over the MANET. The packet 
size of CBR is fixed at 512 bytes.  
Simulations run under two circumstances: static circumstance (all nodes are static at 
their positions), and dynamic circumstance (all nodes move randomly inside the network 
area). For the static circumstance, the traffic load varies from 250Kb/sec to 10Kb/sec, and 
the hop count from the source node to the termination node varies from 1 to 10. The node 
density of the static circumstance is set to be n = 50, 30, and 20 nodes per broadcasting 
area. The node density of the dynamic circumstance is set to be n = 30 nodes per 
broadcasting area. 
3.5.2 Simulation Results 
As shown in Figures 3-4, 3-5, and 3-6, when n = 50, the mechanism of background 
broadcasting affects network performance significantly since the packet delivery ratio 
without background broadcasting is higher than that with background broadcasting. 
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However, in most implementations, MANETs are constructed with their node density n = 
20 or 30 nodes per broadcasting area. When n = 20 or 30, the effect of the background 
broadcasting on packet delivery ratio is limited. Especially when the traffic load is less 
than 50kb/s, the packet delivery ratio of CBR with background broadcasting is almost the 
same as that without background broadcasting. Therefore, it can be concluded that in 
practice, the mechanism of background broadcasting will not impair MANET 
performance.  
 
Figure 3-4. Effects of BB on packet delivery rate when n =50 
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Figure 3-5. Effects of BB on packet delivery rate when n = 30 
 
Figure 3-6. Effects of BB on packet delivery rate when n = 20 
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Figure 3-7. Effects of BB on delivery delay when n = 50 
 
Figure 3-8. Effects of BB on delivery delay when n = 30 
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Figure 3-9. Effects of BB on delivery delay when n = 20 
As shown in Figures 3-7, 3-8, and 3-9, when n = 50, the background broadcasting 
may delay packet delivery somewhat for FTP applications. However, in most practical 
implementations in which MANETs are constructed with their node density at n = 20 or 
30 nodes per broadcasting area, the packet delivery delay with background broadcasting 
is almost the same as that without background broadcasting. Therefore, the investigation 
of FTPs’ time delays also supports the conclusion that the mechanism of background 
broadcasting will not impair MANET performance. 
For the dynamic circumstance, the speed of a node is < 5m/sec, and the hop count 
from the source to the destination is 2. From the Figures 3-10 and 3-11, background 
broadcasting would not impair the performance when the traffic load is less than 300kb/s.  
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Figure 3-10. Effects of BB on delivery rate when nodes are moving 
 
Figure 3-11. Effects of BB on delivery delay when nodes are moving 
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One thing need to be noted is that there is only 2 hops from the source node to the 
destination node. This is the reason that the mobile networks can take on such heavy 
traffic loads with such high packet delivery ratios, as shown in Figure 3-10.  
Summary 
For incident logging, the mechanism of node localization is discussed in network 
topology spaces. During the discussion, the concept of Background is introduced. The 
Background can localize mobile nodes without a distance metric. In the chapter, the 
Background is also applied to the node authentication. Because logs are the starting point 
of forensic analyses, incident logging is studied in this chapter. In the following chapters, 
the research would focus on the next stage of forensic support, i.e. the log publishing. 
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Chapter 4 Log Publishing over IP-based Mobile Networks 
From now on, the log publishing (or incident publishing) is taken into account. In 
this chapter, the research is conducted over a general model of mobile networks. The 
objective of the research is to provide a solution to organize log files into a distributed 
database. Meanwhile, a mechanism is designed to limit the communication cost of the 
process of log publishing. 
4.1 Problem Description 
As discussed in Chapter 1, a network incident can be viewed as an aggregation of 
several raw incidents. In addition, these raw incidents or their aggregations should be 
logged for later forensic analyses. In the incident that a hacker compromises a remote 
computer via internet, one can trace back this incident by collecting all related logs and 
analyzing these collected logs. Further, the traffic loads over a particular link vary from 
time to time, and the only way to investigate the traffic variation of this link is to collect 
logs along the link and analyze them. Thus, log files are the only materials (documents) 
that can be worked on to conduct network forensics. 
In addition, all logs distributed throughout the entire network need to be organized. 
For example, there is a raw incident in which a packet from a source node to a 
termination node is delivered. This raw incident is logged at the source node, the 
destination node, and all intermediate relay nodes separately. To reconstruct the delivery 
path of the incident, the logs from those different nodes should be collected (the source 
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node, the destination node, and all intermediate relay nodes). However, if all logs related 
to the incident are not organized, but are scattered randomly throughout the entire 
network, the process of collecting those logs related to the incident will be very difficult. 
Therefore, it is necessary to have all distributed log files organized in order to facilitate 
network forensics. 
Many designs have been proposed in the research field of network forensic support. 
The typical two designs are PPM (probabilistic packet marking) and SPIE (Source Path 
Isolation Engine), which emphasize applications over fixed networks. According to the 
design of PPM, each packet will be marked probabilistically at each node along its 
delivery path. In fact, the marks inserted into the packet can also be treated as logs. 
Specifically, the logs (marks) travel along the packet delivery and converge to the 
termination node of the packet. In this way, related logs (marks) generated at different 
nodes can easily be organized at the termination node.  
Nevertheless, SPIE suggests that passing packets should be logged at local nodes. To 
reduce the volume of logs, SPIE uses blooming filters to hash the content of packets. In 
contrast to organizing logs in advance, SPIE leverages the static topography of fixed 
networks to collect log files related to a particular delivery incident. According to the 
design of SPIE, the termination node of the packet should broadcast first to probe the 
neighbor nodes that possess related logs. This probation would be conducted hop by hop 
until the source node is reached. 
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Unfortunately, both designs of SPIE and PPM can not be deployed over MANETs 
directly. SPIE is obviously not suited for MANET forensics because of the dynamic 
topography of MANETs. Inside a MANET, the nodes involved in a packet delivery may 
move anywhere afterwards. To trace the packet’s delivery path, the probing mechanism 
of broadcasting hop by hop does not work. In fact, log files of a particular incident 
(packet delivery) will scatter throughout the whole MANET area without any fixed 
pattern. Just as the typical intrusion illustrated by Figure 1-2 and in the section 1.1, the 
public server and all relay routers may move everywhere under a mobile circumstance, 
and one-hop broadcasting may not reach and probe the previous step of the attack. 
Furthermore, any attempt to broadcast the probation throughout the network cannot work 
well because of the huge cost.  
Even for PPM design, which seems much better for a mobile environment, there still 
exists a formidable problem. Specifically, the destination nodes of malicious intrusions 
are most likely to be victim nodes and most likely to be compromised or tampered with. 
Consequently, those intrusion-related marks (or logs) that converged and recorded at the 
victim nodes would not be safe, since they could be easily destroyed or simply erased 
after the successful attacks. As a result, forensic analyses have no way to be conducted 
with all these intrusion-related logs destroyed.  
Logically, our design focuses on supporting forensic analysis over mobile networks 
with dynamic topology. Moreover, our design would avoid driving all intrusion-related 
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logs to the destination nodes which are potential victim nodes of malicious intrusions. 
Particularly, our design is fostered from the most popular one of P2P technologies, i.e. 
Distributed Hash Table, and customized to suit the needs of sorting or organizing 
distributed logs. 
DHT (Distributed Hash Table) [May02, Rat01, Row01, Sto01, Zha03] technology 
offers an immediate solution to organizing the distributed log files over MANETs. 
However, problems still exist. All the log files maintained at different nodes are a kind of 
resource, and can be published based on a DHT structure, such as CAN (Content 
Addressable Network), Chord, Pastry or Tapestry, etc. Based on the DHT structure, logs 
related to a particular incident can be easily found and collected from different nodes.  
A problem occurs when an attempt is made to publish these log files, since a 
publishing process is also a network incident and also needs to be logged and published. 
As a result, a publishing process may incur recursively without an end. In addition, we 
cannot fix this recursive problem by only publishing “regular incidents” and ignoring 
“publishing incidents.” If nodes only log and publish regular packets, but ignore 
publishing packets to avoid recursive publishing, hackers can also launch a flood attack 
by solely using publishing packets. Consequently, this flood attack can not be traced back 
because it has not been logged. 
In this chapter, an innovative scheme has been proposed to deal with the problem of 
organizing logs. First, all log files distributed at different nodes must be organized under 
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a DHT structure. In order to avoid recursive publishing, the proposed design links each 
packet’s delivery probability with its publishing probability. Whenever a packet is 
generated at a node, a value between (0, 1] should be assigned by the node. This assigned 
value, deemed delivery rate, is immutable for the lifetime of the packet.  
The packet will carry its delivery rate along its delivery path. At each passing node, a 
packet will be forwarded with the probability of its delivery rate, or will be dropped with 
the complementary probability of its delivery rate. In addition, whenever a packet arrives 
at a node, a publishing packet should be generated at the node to publish the incident of 
the packet arrival. This publishing packet also needs to be assigned a delivery rate, which 
must be less than the delivery rate of the arrived packet. In this way, recursive publishing 
processes may still exist, but will eventually die out.  
The outline of the chapter is as follows: Section 4.2 models logging and publishing 
processes under the typical DHT designs; Section 4.3 presents the designed scheme, 
analysis results, and optimization based on the modeling; Section 4.4 investigates the 
proposed scheme by simulations. 
4.2 Theoretical Analysis: 
4.2.1 Modeling 
A commonly accepted MANET model is followed in this instance. A MANET 
consists of numerous mobile stations, and each mobile station is simply called a “node.” 
Communications among nodes can be carried out via wireless radio, and radios equipped 
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at nodes operate with the same power. Thereafter, two nodes, each of which locates 
outside the other’s radio coverage, may communicate with each other by transmission 
relay nodes, locating between the two nodes. The whole MANET is assumed to be 
connected. This implies that there is always a routing path between any two nodes of the 
MANET. Each node has full computing capability, which suggests that each node may 
play a role as a server, a client or a router. 
At each node, only incidents of packet arrivals are taken into account. As previously 
discussed, any network incident is an aggregation of several raw incidents. Generally, a 
raw incident refers to a packet incident that is transmitted from the source node, through 
intermediate relay nodes, to the termination node. At the node level, a raw incident can be 
described as the following: at a particular time and place, a packet is/is not forwarded or 
received at a particular node. In this Chapter, only the raw incident, “a packet arrived at a 
node,” is considered. In fact, it is trivial to extend analysis to other types of raw incidents, 
such as “a packet is delivered at a node,” “a packet is not arrived at a node,” etc..  
Assumption 1: At each node, any raw incident should be logged, and the storage 
capacity of the node is unlimited. (4-A1) 
As the previous discussions suggest, only raw incidents of packet arrivals are 
considered. Therefore, all logged incidents at a given node should be given the following 
format: “at a particular time and place, a particular packet arrives at the node.” In 
addition, the effect of the storage capacity of nodes is omitted. This is used for incident 
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logging because this chapter focuses on the process of log publishing first and foremost, 
(instead of the process of “incident logging.”) In addition, that the price of storage media 
has dropped substantially in recent years is another factor that was taken into account.  
Assumption 2: Any logged incident at a node should be published, regardless of 
whether the incident is incurred by a regular packet arrival or a publishing packet 
arrival. (4-A2) 
Based on the typical DHT designs, an overlay structure is built for logs publishing. 
Each logged incident should be hashed first. After that, the publishing packet for 
publishing this incident should at least carry the hash result of the incident, the node ID, 
and the timestamp. Under the overlay structure of the DHT, the hash result determines the 
termination node where the publishing packet should be sent. Each logged incident 
includes four items: time, place, node ID and the content of the received packet. Only the 
item of the packet content should be hashed. In this way, the logged incidents with same 
packet content will be published at the same node under DHT architecture. In addition, a 
publishing packet must generate at the node whenever a raw incident occurs. Moreover, 
the publishing process is a one-direction packet delivery (UDP application), and does not 
guarantee whether the publishing packet will reach its termination node or not.  
Assumption 3: For any packet delivery, the hop count from the source node to the 
termination node is fixed to be m.  (4-A3) 
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Clearly, the hop count of each packet delivery varies from case to case. However, 
since a MANET always has limited coverage area, the largest hop count of the MANET 
is finite. Thus, the hop count of every packer delivery is also a finite number with less 
than or equal to the largest hop count. To clarify the analysis, m denotes this finite 
number of every packet delivery.  
4.2.2 Packet-Defined Probabilistic Delivery (PDPD or PD2)  
Rule 1: Each packet should be assigned a value to indicate the delivery rate of the 
packet.  (4-R1) 
The value, called “delivery rate,” should be a positive number less than 1. The 
delivery rate of a packet would not change during the lifetime of the packet. In order to 
guarantee the backward compliance of the PD2 scheme, the default delivery rate is set to 
1 for packets without a “delivery rate.” 
Rule 2: At each node, a packet will be forwarded (or delivered) with a probability 
equal to the delivery rate of the packet.  (4-R2) 
When the delivery rate is 1, the packet should definitely be forwarded. If the delivery 
rate equals 0.5, there is an equal chance that the packet will be forwarded or dropped. If 
the delivery rate is 0, the packet should be dropped immediately. Even at the source node 
of a packet, the Rule 2 still applies. According to Rule 2, when the delivery rate is less 
than 1, the probability that the packet reaches its termination will decrease, as long as the 
hop count (from the source node to the termination node) increases. For example, the 
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delivery rate of a packet is 0.8. When the hop count from the source node to the 
termination node is 3, the probability that the packet can reach its termination node will 
be 0.83. When the hop count of the packet reaches 5, the probability of the packet’s 
successful delivery will be 0.85, which is less than 0.83. 
Rule 3: A function f ( ·) should be shared by all nodes to calculate the delivery rate of 
publishing packets. (4-R3) 
A packet arrival is an incident, and should be logged at the node. Subsequently, a 
publishing packet generates and corresponds to this arrival incident. Similarly, this 
publishing packet should have its own delivery rate. The scheme of PD2 requires that the 
delivery rate of the publishing packet should be associated with the delivery rate of the 
received packet by the function f ( ·). For example, if the delivery rate of the received 
packet is p, the delivery rate of the publishing packet is equal to f ( p). In addition, 0 ≤ f ( p) 
< 1. Detailed discussions about f ( p) will be given in the subsection 4.3.1. Regardless of 
whether the received packet is a regular one or just another publishing packet, the scheme 
of PD2 will treat it in the same way. 
4.3 Analysis 
In this section, we introduce a raw incident of a packet delivery. The packet is going 
to be delivered from the source node to the termination node after m hops (4-A3). In 
addition, the packet has its delivery rate at p (4-R1). Recursive publishing processes 
would be incurred by this packet delivery, and these recursive processes are split into a 
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series of recursive rounds. A recursive round means that all publishing packets generated 
at the same recursive round should have the same delivery rate.  
 
1st recursive round 
3rd recursive round 
2nd recursive round 
Figure 4-1. The first three rounds of the recursive publishing process 
For example, a packet is delivered with the delivery rate p. The process of this packet 
delivery belongs to the first recursive round, because all publishing packets 
corresponding to this packet delivery share the same delivery rate f ( p). Next, the 
publishing packets generated at the first recursive round will incur new publishing 
packets. This process belongs to the second recursive round. In addition, the publishing 
packets of the second recursive round have the delivery rate f ( f ( p)) or f (2)(p), according 
to the rule (4-R3). The first three recursive rounds of a packet delivery are illustrated in 
Figure 4-1. 
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4.3.1 The Total Number of Publishing Packets  
First, it is necessary to calculate the average number of publishing packets incurred 
by a raw incident. As shown in Figure 4-1, the recursive processes are split into recursive 
rounds. The average number of publishing packets will be calculated round by round. 
The first recursive round 
By Rule 2 (4-R2), the probability that the packet will be forwarded at least one-hop is 
p, and the probability that the packet will be forwarded exactly (only) one-hop is P(1, 1) 
= p(1 − p). For P(1, 1), the first “1” denotes the first round, and the second “1” denotes 
one-hop. Similarly, the probability that the packet will be forwarded exactly (and only) 
two-hops is P(1, 2) = p2(1 − p), and so on. The probability that the packet will be 
forwarded exactly (and only) (m − 1) hops is P(1, m − 1) = pm−1(1 − p), and the 
probability that the packet will reach its termination node is P(1, m) = pm. 
Based on the assumptions of (4-A1) and (4-A2), a publishing packet will generate at a 
node whenever a packet arrives at the node. Therefore, the average number of publishing 
packets of the first recursive round N1 is:  
N1 = 1P(1, 1) + 2P(1, 2) + … + (m − 1)P(1, m − 1) + mP(1, m)  
 = ∑ ipi(1 − p) + mpm  −
=
1
1
m
i
 = p(1 − pm)/(1 − p)  (4-E1) 
In addition, according to Rule 3 (i.e. 4-R3), all publishing packets generated at the 
first round should have the same delivery rate f (p).  
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The second recursive round 
For each publishing packet generated at the first recursive round, the hop count from 
its source node to its termination node is still m (4-A3), and its delivery rate is f ( p). 
Similarly, for each publishing packet of the first recursive round, the probability that it 
will move exactly one-hop is P(2, 1) = f ( p)[1 − f ( p)]; the probability that it will move 
exactly two-hops is P(2, 2) = [f ( p)]2[1 − f ( p)]. Also, P(2, m − 1) = [f ( p)](m − 1)[1 − f (p)], 
and P(2, m) = [f ( p)]m. 
On average, each publishing packet of the first recursive round may incur f ( p){1 − 
[f ( p)]m}/[1 − f ( p)] publishing packets at the second recursive round. Therefore, the 
average number of total publishing packets generated at the second recursive round N2 is: 
N2 = N1 f ( p){1 − [f ( p)]m}/[1 − f ( p)] (4-E2) 
The third recursive round 
For each publishing packet generated at the second recursive round, the hop count 
from its source node to its termination node is still m (A3), and its delivery rate is f (2)(p) = 
f ( f ( p)). Still, for each publishing packet of the second recursive round, the probability 
that it will move only one-hop is P(3, 1) = f (2)(p)[1 − f (2)(p)]. Similarly,  
P(3, 2) = [f (2)(p)]2[1 − f (2)(p)],  
… …,  
P(3, m − 1) = [f (2)(p)](m − 1)[1 − f (2)(p)],  
P(3, m) = [f (2)(p)]m. 
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On the average sense, each publishing packet of the second recursive round would 
incur f (2)(p){1 − [ f (2)(p)]m}/[1 − f (2)(p)] publishing packets at the third recursive round. 
The average number of total publishing packets of the third recursive round N3 is: 
N3 = N2 f (2)(p){1 − [f (2)(p)]m}/[1 − f (2)(p)]. (4-E3) 
The n-th recursive round 
For each publishing packet generated at the (n − 1)th recursive round, the hop count 
from its source node to its termination node is m (A3), and its delivery rate is f (n−1)(p) = 
f ( …f ( f ( p))…). Still, for each publishing packet of the (n − 1)th recursive round, the 
probability that it will move exactly one-hop is  
P(n, 1) = f (n − 1)(p)[1 − f (n − 1)(p)].  
Similarly,  
P(n, 2) = [f (n − 1)(p)]2[1 − f (n − 1)(p)], 
… …,  
P(n, m − 1) = [f (n − 1)(p)](m−1)[1 − f (n − 1)(p)],  
P(n, m) = [f (n − 1)(p)]m. 
On the average sense, each publishing packet of the (n − 1)th recursive round may 
incur f (n − 1)(p){1 − [f (n − 1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (n − 1)(p)] publishing packets at the nth recursive 
round. The average number of total publishing packets of the n-th recursive round is: 
Nn = Nn − 1 f (n − 1)(p){1 − [f (n − 1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (n − 1)(p)]. (4-En) 
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On average, the total number of publishing packets incurred by the incident of a 
packet delivery should be N = N1 + N2 + N3 + … … + Nn + … … 
For these recursive processes, the average number of total publishing packets N is 
expected to be limited. When f ( p) > p, for any p ]1,0[∈ , the average number of 
publishing packets of the second recursive round is greater than that of the first recursive 
round, and the average number of publishing packets of the third recursive round is 
greater than that of the second recursive round, and so on. In such cases, it is unavoidable 
for the number of publishing packets to explode. Therefore, it is required that p > f ( p) for 
any p . In fact, this requirement infers that p > f ( p) > f (2)(p) > … …> f (n − 1)(p) 
> … …, for any p . However, in order to guarantee that N be a limited number, this 
requirement (p > f ( p) for any p
]1,0[∈
]1,0[∈
]1,0[∈ ) is still not enough, and more conditions need to 
be fulfilled. 
Theorem 1: For any p , and a limited number k, if p > f ( p) and Nk < 1, then N 
is limited, and roughly f (k − 1)(p) ≤ 0.5 . 
]1,0[∈
Proof:  
As p > f ( p) and f ( p) , ]1,0[∈
It follows that p > f ( p) > f (2)(p) > … … > f (k−1)(p) > … … 
To be uniform, let p = f (0)(p); f ( p) = f (1)(p); and N0 = 1. 
Also because 
f (i)(p) + [f (i)(p)]2 + … … + [f (i)(p)]m = f (i)(p){1 − [f (i)(p)]m}/[1 − f (i)(p)], 
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Thus,  
f (0)(p){1 − [f (0)(p)]m}/[1 − f (0)(p)]  
> f (1)(p){1 − [f (1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (1)(p)]  
> ... …  
> f (k − 1)(p){1 − [f (k − 1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (k − 1)(p)]  
> … … 
As Nk = Nk − 1f (k − 1)(p){1 − [f (k − 1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (k − 1)(p)]  
= f (0)(p){1 − [f (0)(p)]m}/[1 − f (0)(p)] ×  
f (1)(p){1 − [f (1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (1)(p)] ×  
... … ×  
f (k − 1)(p){1 − [f (k − 1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (k − 1)(p)] 
Given Nk < 1 
Hence, f (k − 1)(p){1 − [f (k − 1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (k − 1)(p)] < 1.  
Otherwise, f (0)(p){1 − [f (0)(p)]m}/[1 − f (0)(p)],  
f (1)(p){1 − [f (1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (1)(p)], … …,  
f (k − 1)(p){1 − [f (k − 1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (k − 1)(p)]  
all are greater than 1, and Nk can not be less than 1. 
Consequently,  
f (i − 1)(p){1 − [f (i − 1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (i − 1)(p)] < 1, for any i > k. 
Also, 1 > Nk > Nk + 1>… …,  
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because Ni = Ni − 1f (i − 1)(p){1 − [f (i − 1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (i − 1)(p)] 
Thus,  
N = N1 + N2 + N3 + … … + Nk − 1 + Nk + … … 
= N1 + N2 + N3 + … … + Nk − 1 +  
Nk − 1f (k − 1)(p){1 − [f (k − 1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (k − 1)(p)] +  
Nk − 1f (k − 1)(p){1 − [f (k − 1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (k − 1)(p)] ×  
f (k)(p){1 − [f (k)(p)]m}/[1 − f (k)(p)] +  
… … 
 < N1 + N2 + N3 + … … + Nk − 1 +  
Nk − 1f (k − 1)(p){1 − [f (k − 1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (k − 1)(p)] +  
Nk − 1{f (k − 1)(p){1 − [f (k − 1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (k − 1)(p)]}2 +  
Nk − 1{f (k − 1)(p){1 − [f (k − 1)(p)]m}/[1 − f (k − 1)(p)]}3 +  
… … 
= N1 + N2 + N3 + … … + Nk − 2 +  
Nk − 1{f (k − 1)(p){1 − [f (k − 1)(p)]m}/{1 − 2f (k − 1)(p) + [f (k − 1)(p)]m+1}  
Therefore, the value of N is limited.  
Again, as Nk − 1 + Nk + Nk + 1 + … … should be positive,  
Nk − 1{f (k − 1)(p){1 − [f (k − 1)(p)]m}/{1 − 2f (k − 1)(p) + [f (k − 1)(p)]m+1} should > 0. 
With the effect of [f (k − 1)(p)]m+1 omitted, then 1 − 2·f (k − 1)(p) ≥ 0.  
Thus, f (k − 1)(p) ≤ 0.5 □ 
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Theorem 1 indicates that N can be limited whenever Nk is less than 1 for some k. In 
practice, a large number of k is still unacceptable. In the section of simulation, the k 
selection will be discussed. Here, one more rule should be given to complete the design. 
Rule 4: For a positive integer k, and any p ]1,0[∈ , the shared function f (p) should 
satisfy p > f (p) and Nk < 1. (4-R4) 
4.3.2 The Number of Successful Publishing  
Based on conditions given by Theorem 1, the average number of publishing packets 
incurred by a raw incident is limited. However, it is expected that most of those 
publishing packets will be delivered to their termination nodes successfully during the 
recursive processes of log publishing. If publishing packets are simply dropped on their 
way before they reach their termination nodes, these packets will be of little help on log 
publishing, but only load extra traffics over their delivery path. In this subsection, the 
average number of publishing packets finally arriving at their termination nodes will be 
calculated. Still, the calculation is conducted round by round. 
The first recursive round 
On average, there are N1 publishing packets at this round. Each of these packets at 
this round has the same probability [f ( p)]m of reaching its termination node. Therefore, 
on average, N1[f ( p)]m publishing packets will arrive at their termination nodes at the first 
recursive round.  
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The second recursive round 
At the second recursive round, there are N2 publishing packets on average. Each of 
the packets has [f (2)(p)]m chance to arrive at its termination nodes. Thus, on the average 
sense, N2[f (2)(p)]m publishing packets will arrive at their termination nodes at the second 
recursive round. 
The nth recursive round 
At the nth recursive round, we have Nn publishing packets on average. Each of the 
packets has [f (n)(p)]m chance to arrive at their termination nodes. Therefore, on average, 
Nn[f (n)(p)]m publishing packets will arrive at their termination nodes at the nth recursive 
round. 
4.3.3  Optimization 
Above all, the total number of successful publishing packets on average should be  
N1[f ( p)]m + N2[f (2)(p)]m + … … + Nn[f (n)(p)]m + … .... Thus, to make most publishing 
packets useful or to deliver them successfully, a function f (p) should be selected in order 
to satisfy the following criterion. 
Criterion 1: To optimize PD2, f (p) should be selected to maximize the ratio of 
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Because all f ( p), f (2)(p), … … , f (n)(p), … …, are positive and less than 1, it is clear 
that the above ratio will reach its maximum if all f ( p), f (2)(p), … … , f (n)(p), … …, are 
close to 1. However, if all f ( p), f (2)(p), … … , f (n)(p), … …, are close to 1, the average 
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number of total publishing packets N would be too large to accept. Thus, there is a 
tradeoff with regard to optimizing the performance of PD2.  
Based on the (4-R1) through (4-R4) and (4-C1), the scheme of PD2 can be designed. 
The function f ( p) can be constructed by following the Rule 4 to limit the value of N, and 
by following (4-C1) to gain better performance. 
4.3.4 An Example of f (p) Construction 
In this section, linear function f ( p) = a·p is investigated. The task is to determine the 
optimal value of a for any p∈[0, 1], by following (4-R4) and (4-C1). Here, the hop count 
m is set at 4. As f ( p) = ap; f (2)(p) = a·(a·p)= a2p; ……; f (k − 1)(p) = a(k − 1)p; …… By 
following (4-R4) and set p = 1, the results of the calculation are shown in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1. An example of publishing rate 
 a = 0.4 a = 0.6 a = 0.8 
N1 3 3  3 
N2 1.9488 3.9168  7.0848 
N3 0.3710 2.1662 10.4821 
N4  0.5955 10.2419 
N5    6.9055 
N6    3.3268 
N7    1.1764 
N8    0.3116 
As shown in Table 4-1, to satisfy, when a = 0.4, k should be 3; when a = 0.6, k should 
be 4; when a = 0.8, k should be 8. Similarly, f ( p) can also be constructed in more 
complex ways, such as ap2 + bp + c, αpβ, etc. All efforts regarding the f ( p) construction 
are to improve the performance of the PD2 design. 
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4.4 Simulation 
Using an NS-2 simulator, simulations run within a typical MANET environment. The 
specifications of the MANET mainly follow the model given in section 4.2. The area of 
the MANET is set to be 1000×1000m2. Within the area, nodes are settled at cross-points 
of a uniform square grid, with the grid spacing d = 200m. The transmission radius of each 
node is set to be r = 250m, and AODV (Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector) is selected 
as the routing protocol. 
The goal of simulations is to investigate the performance of PD2, when f ( p) is 
defined as f ( p) = ap and m is set at 4 for all recursive rounds. During the theoretic 
analysis, the average number of publishing packets is calculated. In this section, 
distributions of the total number of publishing packets are presented, as are distributions 
of the number of successfully published packets. A UDP packet delivery initiates the 
whole process, and its delivery rate p is set to be 1 and 0.9, respectively. 
Figures 4-2 and 4-3 show distributions when the delivery rate is p = 1. As shown in 
the two figures, the distribution functions shift towards the right side, when the factor a 
increases from 0.4 to 0.8. As indicated in the Figure 4-2, the total number of publishing 
packets are approximately 10 or 11 when a = 0.4; roughly 14 or 15 when a = 0.6; and 
about 30 or 31 when a = 0.8. 
Compared with the other two cases, many publishing packets are incurred when a = 
0.8. From Figure 4-3, when a = 0.4, the probability of successful publishing is less than 
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0.1; when a = 0.6, the probability of successful publishing is about 1/4; and when a = 0.8, 
the probability of successful publishing is about 0.5. Compared with the other two cases, 
the probability of successful publishing is very small when a = 0.4. Based on the 
observation of these two figures, a = 0.6 is optimal for f ( p). 
The distributions when the delivery rate p = 0.9 are presented in Figures 4-4, 4-5. 
Through observation, a similar conclusion can also be drawn; specifically, a = 0.6 is a 
better choice than are the other two cases (when a = 0.4 and a = 0.8). 
 
Figure 4-2. Probability distribution of publishing packets when p = 1 
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Figure 4-3. Probability distribution of successful publishing when p = 1 
 
Figure 4-4. Probability distribution of publishing packets when p = 0.9 
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Figure 4-5. Probability distribution of successful publishing when p = 0.9 
Summary 
The technology of DHT has been introduced, in terms of incident publishing. This 
technology aims to organize log files into a distributed database. In addition, the problem 
of recursive publishing is put forward, and the solution regarding to this recursion 
problem has been given. This solution limits the total communication cost of log 
publishing. 
In this chapter, a general mobile network is taken as the model of the research. In the 
next two chapters, the incident publishing would be studied in some specific networks, 
and the objective of the research is still to reduce the communication cost of incident 
publishing. 
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Chapter 5 Optimizing Location Publishing over Cellular Networks 
With a general model of mobile networks, incident publishing has been studied in the 
last chapter. In this chapter, incident publishing is still the theme, but the study is targeted 
on cellular networks, which are the most popular mobile networks. In addition, the 
research issue of incident publishing narrows down to the location publishing. The 
objective of the study is to optimize the accumulative cost for the process of location 
publishing, at the mean time, to facilitate tracking the movement of mobile subscribers. 
In this chapter, the structure of “anchor chain” [Bej03] is followed. According to the 
“anchor chain” design, a mobile subscriber only needs to publish its location on the 
anchor. In this way, the communication cost of location publishing would be decreased. 
In addition, the built-in memory of a subscriber is utilized to record the chain structure of 
this subscriber. As a result, the subscriber would carry the record of its chain structure 
along its moving path. When the subscriber moves in a region served by a new VLR, it 
would submit the record of its chain structure to this new VLR. With this submitted 
record, the new VLR would construct a new anchor chain for the subscriber. After that, 
this new chain is downloaded to the subscriber to update its chain record.  
With the “anchor chain” design, an investigator no longer needs to reference the 
HLR every time, in order to track the subscriber’s movement. In fact, the investigator 
only needs to contact the nearest anchor, and this anchor works as an agent to obtain the 
subscriber’s current location. When the nearest anchor is discarded by the chain update, 
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the investigator may search backward along the original chain, or simply contact the HLR, 
in regards to finding active anchors. By referencing the nearest anchor rather than the 
HLR, the investigator may spot the mobile subscriber fast. 
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.1, the problem of location 
publishing is described; in Section 5.2, the research model is formulated, and the design 
is presented; Performance complexity of the design is analyzed in Section 5.3; Section 
5.4 examines simulations to verify the efficiency of the design. 
5.1 Problem Description 
In cellular networks, mobile subscribers should always publish their locations when 
roaming. The process of this publishing is generally called “location registration” or 
“location binding.” The moving path of a mobile subscriber can always be traced by 
referencing its published locations.  
Research efforts on optimizing the process of location registration have never been 
halted since the inception of mobile communication. According to the standard IS-41, 
mobile subscribers should always register their current locations on their HLRs directly. 
However, when a mobile subscriber is far away from its HLR, or when the mobile 
subscriber changes its location frequently, the cost of its location publishing is huge. 
According to the standard IS-41, the accumulative publishing cost of a mobile subscriber 
can be O(M 2 ) in the worst scenarios. Here, M denotes the distance that a mobile 
subscriber has moved.  
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In addition, to track the movement of a mobile subscriber, the investigator must 
reference the HLR of this subscriber. Mostly, the subscriber and the investigator are not 
far away from each other. Therefore, it would seem a waste to the investigator to 
reference the subscriber’s HLR, whenever the subscriber moves. 
5.2 Model and Algorithm 
This section is divided into five subsections. The first sub-section states assumptions 
and concepts. The second sub-section full describes the model on which the study would 
be based. In the third and fourth sub-section, two designs, i.e. static scheme and dynamic 
scheme, are specified respectively. 
5.2.1 Assumptions and Concepts 
5.2.1.1 Assumptions 
a) Communication cost between any two nodes refers to the communication cost 
along the shortest routing path of these two nodes. 
b) All paths are bi-directional, with the same communication cost for each direction. 
c) Each mobile subscriber has one HLR. 
5.2.1.2 Concepts 
a) Location Information Value (VL.I.): 
The metric, VL.I. (Location Information Value), derives from the communication cost. 
As shown in Figure 5-1, there is an association (i.e. chain links) from HLR to VLR_1, 
and from VLR_1 to VLR_2. Then, the VL.I. of VLR_2 is the communication cost from 
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VLR_1 to VLR_2; the VL.I. of VLR_1 is the communication cost from HLR to VLR_1; 
and the VL.I. of HLR is 0. 
HLR 
VL.I.=0 
Mobile terminal
VLR_1 
VL.I.=20 
Expense=20 
Expense
VLR_2 
VL.I.=5 
 
Figure 5-1. Example I of location information value 
It is important to note that the values of VL.I. are related to the direction of the 
association. As shown in Figure 5-1, the direction of the association is 
HLR→VLR_1→VLR_2. In such case, the values of VL.I. are 0, 20, and 5, which are 
corresponding to HLR, VLR_1, and VLR_2 respectively. If the direction of the 
association is reversed, as shown in Figure 5-2, the association of these three nodes 
becomes VLR_2→VLR_1→HLR. In this case, VL.I. of VLR_2 should be 0, VL.I. of 
VLR_1 should be 5, and VL.I. of HLR should be 20. 
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HLR 
VL.I.=20 
Mobile terminal
VLR_1 
VL.I.=5 
cost=20 
cost=5 
VLR_2 
VL.I.=0 
 
Figure 5-2. Example II of location information value 
b) Anchor chain structure: 
Table 5-1. An example of anchor chain structure 
Seq_No.=0, ID=HLR, VL.I.=0; 
Seq_No.=1, ID=VLR_1, VL.I.=20; 
Seq_No.=2, ID=VLR_2, VL.I.=5. 
The anchor chain structure includes ID numbers and values of VL.I. of the anchor 
nodes along the chain. In addition, the anchor chain structure should include the sequence 
numbers of the anchor nodes. The direction of an anchor chain goes from the HLR to the 
serving VLR. The VL.I. of each anchor node is the communication cost from the previous 
neighbor anchor to itself. For the anchor chain shown in Figure 5-1, the anchor chain 
structure is listed in Table 5-1.  
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One thing that needs to be concerned is the generation of VL.I.s. All anchors of a chain 
are nodes that the mobile subscriber has visited. Therefore, the VL.I. of an anchor node can 
be obtained by referencing the node’s routing table, during the time that the mobile 
subscriber is visiting. 
5.2.2 The Model 
In a GSM network, every node functions as an LR (location register). For a mobile 
subscriber, one of these LRs is the subscriber’s HLR, and all the other LRs are the 
subscriber’s VLRs. Each mobile subscriber possesses a built-in memory and a timer. The 
built-in memory would be used to record the subscriber’s chain structure.  
When a mobile subscriber enters a new location, its anchor chain structure will be 
submitted to the LR that serves this new location. After that, a process of chain update is 
invoked at the serving LR. The output of the chain update is a new chain structure. This 
new anchor chain would also be downloaded to the mobile subscriber, in order to update 
its original chain structure. When a call request arrives at the subscriber, the current 
serving LR will publish its location on the mobile subscriber’s HLR directly. As a result 
of the call request, the anchor chain of the mobile subscriber only includes two nodes, the 
subscriber’s HLR and the subscriber’s serving LR.  
When a mobile subscriber moves out of its home region, it will register on the local 
LR, and this local LR will bind to the subscriber’s HLR directly. At this time, the anchor 
chain of the subscriber (i.e. from HLR to the local LR) consists of two nodes. After that, 
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the mobile subscriber continues its movement and enters into a new area served by a new 
LR. The mobile subscriber registers on this new LR. Now, there are two options to update 
the anchor chain, as shown in Figure 5-3. One option is to construct the anchor chain 
from HLR to the new LR directly; the other option is to construct the anchor chain from 
HLR to the original local LR (original anchor), then to the new LR. The new anchor 
chain of the mobile subscriber must be selected from these two options. 
HLR 
Local VLR 
New VLR 
Moving 
Chainc 
Chaind 
Mobile terminal Mobile terminal 
 
Figure 5-3. An example of chain update 
Based on the discussion above, the problem of the chain update can be transferred to 
the problem of selecting a new anchor chain from the possible options. In the next two 
sub-sections, two algorithms of the anchor chain update are designed. They are static 
algorithm and dynamic algorithm under different assumptions.  
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5.2.3 Static Algorithm 
Assumption: A phone call request must arrive during the time that the subscriber is 
at the new LR (5-AS) 
n−1 
Cn−1, n  
Cm, n+1  
Cn−2, n−1  
C0, 1  
…… 
…… 
n+1 
n 
n−2 m
1 
0 
 
Figure 5-4. Anchor chain and its update 
Anchor nodes along the chain are indexed. The HLR, which is always the origin 
point of an anchor chain, is indexed by ‘0’, and the index numbers of anchors increase 
along the chain. Let the index of the serving LR be ‘n’, and the new LR that the 
subscriber just moved in be ‘n+1’. An anchor with index m (0 ≤ m ≤ n) would be selected 
to form the new chain that is 0, 1 … m, n+1. In this way, the communication cost of 
location publishing equals the communication cost from anchor m to anchor n+1, denoted 
by Cm, n+1 . The anchor chain and indexes of anchors are shown in Figure 5-4. The call 
tracking cost is ∑k=1…mCk−1, k + m·E[D]+Cm, n+1 . Here, E[D] refers to the cost of average 
delay at each anchor. Therefore, the optimal criterion of the anchor chain update should 
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be finding the anchor m from the entire chain, in order to minimize the communication 
cost of location publishing and call tracking. 
min { Ck−1, k + m·E[D]+2Cm, n+1}|m, m = 0, 1, …, n  (5-CS) ∑
=
m
k 1
Let ∑k=1…mCk−1, k + m·E[D]+2Cm, n+1 = Opt-S(m), The static algorithm for the anchor 
chain update is listed in Table 5-2.  
Table 5-2. Static algorithm of chain update 
1. Let i = 0, j = 0; 
2. If Opt-S(i) > Opt-S(j) then i = j; 
Otherwise, do nothing; 
3. j = j + 1; 
4. If j = n + 1, then go to step 6; 
5. Go to step 2; 
6. Node i is optimal access node; 
7. Assign new VL.I. to node i; 
8. Download new chain structure to 
subscriber 
Following the static algorithm, a property of the anchor chains is presented. In brief, 
this property states that the “length” of an anchor chain is up-bounded. This property will 
be useful in the Section 5.3 where the performance complexity of the design is analyzed.  
Property I: Given an anchor chain of a mobile subscriber, which is updated by 
following the static algorithm, any two anchors of the anchor chain with their index (i, j) 
and j < i, will always have the relationship 5- ES hold. Here, E[D] equals to zero. 
Cj, i ≤ Ck−1, k ≤ 2Cj, i .  (5-ES) ∑
+=
i
jk 1
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Proof: 
There are two anchors (i, j) on the chain, and j < i, as shown in the Figure 5-5. 
Assuming that the subscriber moves back to node i at the next step, by following 
the static algorithm, there is a relationship: 
2Ci, i + Ck−1, k ≤ 2·Ci−1, i + Ck−1, k ≤ 2Cj, i + Ck−1, k ∑
=
i
k 1
∑−
=
1
1
i
k
∑
=
j
k 1
For Ci, i = 0, then  
∑
+=
i
jk 1
Ck−1, k ≤ 2Cj, i .  
j+1 
i 
…… 
Cj, j+1  
i−1  
Cj, i  
Ci−1, i  
j 
…… 
  …… 
 
Figure 5-5. Chain structure between node i and j 
Because the shortest routing path is defined over a network topology space, the 
network can then be treated as a normed space [Kol99]. Therefore, the triangle 
inequality of a normed space should be hold, and the result is  
Cj, i ≤ Ck−1, k .  □ ∑
+=
i
jk 1
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5.2.4 Dynamic Algorithm 
Assumption: The arrival of the phone call request is a Poisson process. (5-AD) 
The anchor chain is shown in Figure 5-4. The mobile subscriber just moves from 
anchor n to anchor n+1. Anchor m is selected to form the new chain, which is 0, 1 … m, 
n+1. Therefore, the cost of location publishing is Cm, n+1 , and the cost of possible call 
tracking is ∑k=1…mCk−1, k + mE[D]+Cm, n+1 .  
Let Xl be the time interval between (l−1)th phone call arrival and lth phone call arrival, 
then P{Xl ≤ t} = 1−e−λt. Let μ be CMR (Call to Mobility Ratio); c denotes the average 
number of phone call arrivals during the time period T; and m denotes the average 
number of movements during the same time period T. Then, (T/m) = (Tμ/c) = (μ/λ) is the 
average time period that a mobile subscriber stays at a location. Let t0 denote the time 
point of the beginning of the last phone call; t1 denotes the time point of the end of the 
last phone call; t2 denotes the time point of the last movement. Here, t2 > t1. Otherwise, it 
would be the cases of call handover and would not be included in this research.  
During the time period (t2, t2+μ/λ], the probability of the next phone call arrival is 
calculated as follow. Because P{Xl ≤ t2+μ/λ−t0} = 1−exp[−λ(t2-t0)−μ], and no other call 
arrives during the time period (t0, t2], the probability that a call arrives during the time 
period (t2, t2+μ/λ] is still 1−exp[−λ(t2-t0)−μ]. Then, the average cost of call tracking during 
the time period (t2, t2+μ/λ] is:  
{ Ck−1, k + m·E[D]+Cm, n+1}{1−exp[−λ(t2-t0)−μ]}.  (5-ED) ∑
=
m
k 1
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Let Opt-D(m) = {∑k=1…mCk−1, k + m·E[D]+Cm, n+1}{1−exp[−λ(t2-t0)−μ]} + Cm, n+1, the 
optimization criterion is to search along the anchor chain to find the minimum Opt-D(m).  
min {Opt-D(m)}, m = 0, 1, …, n. (5-CD) 
As shown in Table 5-3, the dynamic algorithm is similar to the static algorithm, 
except that Opt-D(m) substitutes for Opt-S(m). Also, there is a similar property to 
up-bound the length of anchor chains, which is updated by following the dynamic 
algorithm.  
Table 5-3. Dynamic algorithm of chain update 
1. Let i = 0, j = 0; 
2. If Opt-D(i) > Opt-D(j) then i = j; 
Otherwise, do nothing; 
3. j = j + 1; 
4. If j = n + 1, then go to step 6; 
5. Go to step 2; 
6. Node i is optimal access node; 
7. Assign new VL.I. to node i; 
8. Download new chain structure to 
subscriber 
For both static and dynamic algorithms, some anchor nodes may be discarded from 
the chain after a chain update. Especially for the cases that a discarded anchor is the agent 
of an investigation, the movement tracking would be disturbed. However, the investigator 
can still find an active anchor by searching along the original chain. In this design, 
anchors are required to log the anchor chain periodically. Whenever movement tracking 
is stopped, the investigator should request these logged chains from the agent. 
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5.3 Performance Analysis 
Let D(u, v) be the distance between nodes (LRs) of u and v, and C(u, v) be the 
communication cost between them. There is a relationship C(u, v) ≤ kD(u, v), which is 
widely accepted [Bej03]. Here, k is a constant. This inequality implies an equivalent 
relationship between C(u, v) and D(u, v), Since 0D(u, v) ≤ C(u, v) ≤ c·D(u, v). Therefore, 
C(u, v) and D(u, v) are exchangeable, in terms of performance analysis. In this section, 
only D(u, v) is used. 
In this section, the performance complexity is analyzed in respect to the static 
algorithm. The extension of the analysis to the dynamic algorithm is trivial. In addition, 
only the communication cost of location publishing is considered. For the accumulative 
cost of “location publishing,” three worst cases exist. They are discussed in the following 
five sub-sections. 
5.3.1 Case I 
As shown in Figure 5-6, a mobile subscriber starts its travel from its HLR. At the 
first step, the subscriber moves from its HLR to node 1 (maybe by aircraft). Then, M, 
which is the distance the subscriber has moved, equals L. Also, Bind, which is the 
accumulative location publishing cost, equals L.  
After that, the mobile subscriber moves to node 2. When the mobile subscriber is at 
node 2, it has two options to publish its current location on node 1, or on its HLR. By 
following the static algorithm, the mobile subscriber would publish its location on the 
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node 1, if 2D(1,2) + L < 2[L − D(1,2)]. Otherwise, the mobile subscriber would publish 
its location on the HLR. Therefore, 0.25L is a critical value for the second step D(1,2). 
Because 2D(1,2) + L = 2[L − D(1,2)] will be hold when D(1,2) = 0.25L. If D(1,2) < 0.25L, 
the mobile subscriber will bind to node 1. In this case, Bind = D(1,2) + L and M = D(1,2) 
+ L, which is not the worst case. If D(1,2) > 0.25L, the mobile subscriber would publish 
its location on HLR. In this case, M = L + D(1,2) and Bind = 2L − D(1,2). The ratio of 
M/Bind reaches its minimum 5/7, when D(1,2) = 0.25L. 
HLR 
L 
  .752×.25L   0.75×0.25L   0.25L 
1 2 3 4 
 
Figure 5-6. Chain updates of the worst case I 
Similar analyses can be done in the following steps, such as the step from node 2 to 
node 3, from node 3 to node 4, …, until the mobile subscriber goes back to its HLR (after 
infinite steps). Therefore, in the worst case I, 
M = L + 0.25L + 0.25(1−0.25)L + 0.25(1−0.25)2L +… = 2L 
Bind = L + (1−0.25)L + (1−0.25)2L + (1−0.25)3L +… = 4L 
Bind = 2 M  (5-E1) 
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5.3.2 Case II 
HLR 
1 
R 
3 
4 
R 
R 
R 
2 
 
Figure 5-7. Chain updates of the worst case II 
As shown in Figure 5-7, a mobile subscriber starts from HLR. After the first step, the 
mobile subscriber moves along a circle. In addition, the HLR is at the centre of the circle, 
and the radius is R. When the mobile subscriber moves to node 2, the critical condition is 
2R = R + 2D(1,2). By following the similar logic presented in case I, the critical distance 
for D(1,2) is 0.5R. Now, the mobile subscriber is at node 2. If D(1,2) > 0.5R, the mobile 
subscriber would publish its location on the HLR. In this case, M = R + D(1,2) = 1.5R; 
Bind = 2R. The ratio of (M/Bind) reaches its minimum 3/4 when D(1,2) = 0.5R. Similar 
analyses can be processed in the following steps, such as the step from node 2 to node 3, 
from node 3 to node 4, and so on. After N steps,  
M = R + 0.5RN; Bind = R + RN.  
Therefore, in the worst case II, Bind = 2 M  when N→∞, (5-E2) 
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5.3.3 Preparation I for Case III 
As shown in Figure 5-8, only the movement and the publishing cost after node C are 
taken into account. The mobile subscriber moves from node B to node A at the last step, 
and publish its location on node C. Let the distance from C to B along the anchor chain 
(which is a curvy path) be D(C~B) = βD(C, B). According to the property I (up-bound 
property) in Section 5.2, it is known that 1 ≤ β ≤ 2.  
Θ 
B 
A 
C 
 
Figure 5-8. Chain updates for preparation I of the worst case III 
To be one of the worst cases, node A should be located at the critical point, which 
means that 
2D(A, C) = βD(C, B) + 2D(A, B) …(5-Ea) 
The network can be mapped into Euclidean spaces, because it is assigned with a 
distance metric (i.e. the shortest routing path). Therefore, D(A, C), D(C, B), and D(A, B) 
should abide by the Law of Cosines. Therefore, 
D2(A, C) = D2(C, B) + D2(A, B) − 2D(C, B)D(A, B)cosΘ …(5-Eb) 
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From equations (5-Ea) and (5-Eb),  
D(A, B) = [(1 − 0.25β2)/(β + 2cosΘ)]D(C, B), and, (5-Ec) 
D(A, C) = [(0.25 β2 + βcosΘ + 1)/(β + 2cosΘ)]D(C, B) (5-Ed) 
For the worst case, the subscriber publishes its location on node C. Then,  
M = D(C~B) + D(A, B); Bind = D(C~B) + D(A, C), and,  
M/Bind = (3β2+8βcosΘ+4)/(5β2+12βcosΘ+4) (5-Ee) 
Based on the results above, no matter how much Θ is, the ratio would get its 
minimum 2/3 when β = 2. In this scenario, D(A, B) = 0 and D(A, C) = D(C, B) = 
0.5D(C~B). 
5.3.4 Preparation II for Case III 
As shown in Figure 5-9, this situation is almost the same as that described in 
subsection 5.3.3, except the link from anchor D to anchor E. From anchor D to anchor E, 
the mobile subscriber does not move one step, but goes multiple steps along a curvy path. 
When the mobile subscriber travels along this curvy path, its anchor chain also goes 
along this curvy path. Until the mobile subscriber reaches node E, the chain is updated 
and the mobile subscriber publishes its location on node D. As a result, the anchor chain 
of the mobile subscriber goes from node D to node E directly (i.e. along the shortest 
routing path between these two nodes). In fact, what happened from node D to node E is 
the same as that from node A to node C presented in Subsection 5.3.3.  
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Figure 5-9. Chain update for preparation II of the worst case III 
Before the chain link from node D to node E is set up, the subscriber moves from D 
to E along a curvy path with multiple steps. E-1 is the node from which the subscriber 
moves to node E. Let D(D~E-1) be the distance from D to E-1 along the curvy path, and 
D(D~E-1) = βDED(D, E-1). According to property I in Section 5.2, 1 ≤ βDE ≤ 2. 
Now, the mobile subscriber moves from node A to node B. The accumulative 
distance the mobile subscriber moves after node C is:  
M = D(C~B) + D(A, B) − D(D, E) + D(D~E-1) + D(E-1, E)  
The accumulative communication cost of location publishing after node C is: 
Bind = D(C~B) + D(A, C) + D(D~E-1)  
By following the similar analysis logic performed in preparation I, the minimum 
ratio M/Bind can only be approached when β = 2 and βDE = 2. 
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5.3.5 Case III 
As shown in Figure 5-10, the solid line represents the moving path of the mobile 
subscriber. All broken lines denote links that are solely caused by the chain update. In 
fact, case III is a generalized situation of the subsections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4.  
Let the length of the solid line be L. Based on results of preparation I and II, in the 
worst case, the length of the broken line d should be 0.5L, the length of the broken line 
e is 0.52L, and the length of the broken line f is 0.53L, and so on. Hence: 
M = L, and, Bind = L + 0.5L + 0.52L + 0.53L + … = 2L.  
Again, for the worst case III, Bind = 2 M . (5-E3) 
…… 
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Figure 5-10. Chain update of the worst case III 
Any movement and location publishing can be bound by these 3 worst cases. Thus, 
the ratio M/Bind ≤ 0.5, and the cost of location publishing is within the order of O(M).  
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5.4 Simulation 
Simulations are conducted within an area of 1000×1000 square miles. In the area, 
two thousand LRs are scattered with a uniform distribution. The geographic distance is 
used as the communication cost between nodes. In addition, twenty mobile subscribers 
move randomly. Their HLRs are scattered in the area with a uniform distribution. For the 
first scenario, CMR varies from 2 to 20. The accumulative cost of location publishing for 
each strategy is divided by the accumulative cost for the standard IS-41. “Anchor Chain” 
represents the strategy proposed in [Bej03]. As shown in Figure 5-11, along with the 
increment of CMR, the performances of static and dynamic strategies are getting better. 
Moreover, the performances of these two (i.e. static and dynamic strategies) are better 
than those of the “anchor chain” strategy proposed in [Bej03]. 
 
Figure 5-11. Performance comparison of different strategies 
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In the next simulation, the ratios (M/Bind) of these four strategies are considered. 
The moving step for each subscriber is limited to three hundred miles. As shown in 
Figure 5-12, it is evident that the slopes of both static and dynamic strategies are lower 
than that of the “anchor chain” strategy proposed in [Bej03]. 
 
Figure 5-12. Relationship of binding cost and movement 
Summary 
In terms of location publishing, the design of “anchor chain” [Bej03] has been 
improved. Additionally, the accumulative cost of location publishing is minimized. More 
importantly, the design presented in the chapter may greatly reduce the time of movement 
tracking. As a result, policeman can quickly spot the criminal subscribers. Incident 
publishing (or location publishing) has been researched in cellular networks. According 
to the chapter, the cost of incident publishing can be reduced greatly, when some structure 
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(i.e. anchor chain) is introduced in the process of incident publishing. In the next chapter, 
the technology of “in-network processing” would be introduced for the process of 
incident publishing, with regards of reducing the cost of the physical incident publishing.  
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Chapter 6 Physical Incident Publishing over Wireless Sensor Networks 
In this chapter, the incident publishing is studied in the context of wireless sensor 
networks, which is another popular network model of the current research. Specifically, 
the incident refers to the physical incident that a sensor node has sensed. In addition, the 
sink node is the termination of each process of incident publishing. The objective of this 
research is still to reduce the communication cost of incident publishing.  
6.1 Problem Description 
For wireless sensor networks (WSNs), source nodes (i.e. the sensor nodes with 
sensory date) should have their sensory data (indicating physical incidents) published at 
the sink node. In most cases, the sink node is far away from the source nodes. This 
implies that it is costly to publish sensory data from every source node to the sink node. 
Thereafter, the technology of “in-network processing” is developed [Hei01]. According 
to this technology, the process of publishing sensory data at the sink node is divided into 
two phases. In the first phase, sensory data should be converged to some local nodes, and 
aggregated there. In the second phase, these aggregated data are delivered to the sink 
node and published there. In this chapter, the implementations of these two phases are 
studied, in terms of energy efficiency and bandwidth consumption.  
In this chapter, the physical signal field is utilized for in-network processing. In fact, 
any WSN implementation aims to monitor some physical incidents, such as flood, wild 
fire, pollution and traffic. In the area that a WSN is monitoring, there must be a physical 
 104
signal. Additionally, the intensity (strength) of this physical signal varies spatially. Within 
the area, the intensity of the physical signal forms a field. At a source node, the generated 
sensory data should correspond to the intensity of the physical signal. Thus, with the 
sensory data from all source nodes collected, the physical signal field can be figured out. 
Along the gradient direction of the field, sensory data can then be converged to some 
local nodes.  
In Section 6.2, the signal field surrounding a physical incident is analyzed in detail. 
In section 6.3, the designed algorithms are provided. In section 6.4, the performance of 
the design is analyzed through simulations. 
6.2 Analysis 
For a physical object that a WSN is monitoring, there must be a physical signal 
emitted from the object. The physical signal can be sensed by the sensor nodes of the 
WSN. Moreover, the physical signal forms a field. This can be illustrated by the 
following example. 
Example: a group of people spread in an area and act as sensor nodes. Now, a bear 
comes. Somebody may see that the bear is coming; somebody may see that a black dot is 
moving; and somebody may see nothing. When the bear goes closer to a person, the 
people can see the bear clearer. When a person is standing too far away from the bear, the 
person doesn’t know at all that the bear is around.  
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The example above can be described in another way: there is a sight field 
surrounding the bear. At each location, the field intensity is related to the distance 
between the location and the bear. If a location is closer to the bear, the field intensity at 
this location is higher; at this location, the person may see the bear clearer. If another 
location is far away from the bear, the field intensity of this location goes to zero; at this 
location, the person can not see the bear.  
Therefore, it is the physical signal field that a WSN can sense. At each location, the 
intensity of the field corresponds to the amplitude of the sensed signal. Moreover, the 
amplitude of the sensed signal corresponds to the value of sensory data. The physical 
signal field bridges the physical object to the sensory data. In addition, the temporal 
variation of the sensory data indicates that a physical incident occurs 
Physical signal fields of different objects can overlap with each other. In a 
three-dimensional space, if the height corresponds to the intensity of physical signal 
fields, the shape of physical signal fields may look like mountains spanning across the 
area. 
In this research, the physical signal field is explored to cluster sensor nodes. As 
shown in Figure 6-1, the area can be divided into small pitches by valleys and saddles. 
This division can also be leveraged across node clustering. As a result, there is no 
overhead cost for node clustering. Moreover, this clustering scheme adapts to the spatial 
variation of the field, especially for the cases when some sensor nodes die. 
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In this research, the physical signal field is also explored for routing. In fact, 
field-based routing is not new. In [Poo00], packets can be driven along the gradient 
direction of the cost field. In this chapter, the physical signal field is a substitute for the 
cost field. Along the gradient direction of the physical signal field, sensory data are 
converged to mountain peaks of their local clusters. At the mountain peaks, sensory data 
are aggregated. In this way, in-network processing is conducted.  
6.3 Algorithm 
Within WSNs, the routing scheme should be divided into two phases. The first phase 
works for in-network processing. The second phase works for delivering packets to the 
sink node. Corresponding to these two phases, there are two tags. One tag is “sink 
routing” (SR); the other tag is “in-network processing” (INP). If a delivered packet is in 
the first phase, it should be assigned by INP; if a delivered packet is in the second phase, 
it should assign by SR.  
It is assumed that the scheme of sink routing is given. (The sink routing can be 
Reverse Path Forwarding, Cost value field Forwarding, Geographical Forwarding). In 
this section, the routing schemes for the first phase (i.e. in-network processing) are 
presented. 
Gradient directions of a physical signal field can be used for in-network processing 
in many ways. For example, gradient directions can be used directly, and can drive 
sensory data to local peaks of a physical signal field. Also, gradient directions of two 
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different fields can be mixed together to drive the sensory data’s deliveries. In this design, 
two routing schemes are proposed for in-network processing. The first routing scheme is 
called Center Convergence Scheme (CCS), which routes sensory data to local peaks of 
the physical signal field. The second routing scheme is called Linear Combination 
Scheme (LCS), in which the routing direction of each hop is derived from a linear 
superposition of two gradient directions. These two gradient directions are derived from 
two different fields: one gradient direction is derived from the physical signal field, and 
the other gradient direction is from the cost value field initiated by the sink node.  
6.3.1 Center Convergence Scheme (CCS) 
In CCS, gradient directions of a physical signal field are used for in-network 
processing. Whenever a message (data packet) is generated at a node, it will be tagged by 
INP first. After that, the node probes among its neighbor nodes to find out which node 
senses the strongest physical signal. This is called the probing process. If the signal 
intensity at the node is higher than that at all its neighbor nodes, the tag of the message 
should change to SR. Otherwise, the message should be sent to the neighbor node with 
the highest signal intensity.  
Similarly, if a message is received from some other node, its tag should be checked 
first. For the message with SR, it will be delivered according to the given sink routing 
scheme. For the message with INP, a probing process will be invoked. In addition, a 
memory buffer is defined at each node for the message (data) aggregation. CCS consists 
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of two programs that need to be run separately and simultaneously at each node. Those 
two programs are written in pseudo codes that follows the structure of C language. 
Table 6-1. Buffer control of CCS scheme 
1 If (message is generated at the node) 
2 { Add the tag INP to the message; 
3  Put the message into the buffer; 
4 } else if (message is received from other nodes) 
5 { check the tag of the message; 
6  If (the tag is INP) 
7  { put the message into the buffer; 
8  } else if (the tag is SR) 
9  { deliver the message to sink; 
  } 
 } 
Table 6-2. Publishing control of CCS scheme 
1  while (the pre-defined timer runs out) 
2  { aggregate messages in the buffer; 
3   Let Val = data sensed by the node; 
4   Probe Val of neighbor nodes; 
5   If (exist neighbor with greater Val) 
6   { title the aggregated message with INP; 
7    Select the neighbor with greatest Val; 
8    Send the message to this neighbor; 
9   } else 
10   { title the aggregated message with SR; 
11    Deliver the message to sink; 
12   } empty the buffer; 
13   Reset the time; 
  } 
The first program checks the tag of messages. When a message (data packet) arrives, 
its tag will be checked first. If the tag is INP, then the message will be put into the 
memory buffer; if not, its tag must be SR, and the message will be delivered to the sink 
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by following the sink routing scheme. It is assumed that the scheme of sink routing is 
given. If a message is generated at the node, the message will always be tagged INP 
initially and put into the buffer. The pseudo codes are shown in Table 6-1. 
The second program has two tasks: one is to probe the node’s neighbors in order to 
find the local peak of the physical signal field and the other task is to aggregate messages. 
When a predefined timer runs out, all messages in the memory buffer are aggregated. 
After that, a tag is assigned to the aggregated message. If the node is at a local peak of the 
physical signal field, the aggregated message should be tagged “SR” and delivered to the 
sink node under the given sink routing scheme. Otherwise, if the node is not at a local 
peak of the physical signal field, the aggregated message is tagged as “INP” and 
forwarded along the gradient direction of the physical signal field. 
6.3.2 Linear Combination Scheme 
The LCS design aims at in-network processing. In addition, LCS requires that the 
sink routing scheme should be “Cost value field Based Forwarding” (GRAB). 
At this point, there are two fields over a WSN. They are the cost value field and the 
physical signal field. At each node or at each point where a node locates, two gradient 
directions exist corresponding to those two fields. In the design of LCS, the two gradient 
directions are linearly combined. The combined direction is used for driving sensory data 
convergence (in-network processing).  
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For the cost value field, the minimum cost value “0” is at the sink node and the 
whole field looks like a funnel when we view the cost value as the height of a 
three-dimensional space. For the physical signal field, it looks like a mountain (which is 
an overturned funnel), when the field intensity is viewed as the height of the 
three-dimensional space. In this design, all cost values of the cost field are multiplied by 
−1 in order to turn the “funnel” over. At each node, let its cost value be Vc and its sensed 
signal intensity value of the physical signal field be Vi, then its linear superposition value 
(VL.S.) is VL.S. = −αVc + βVi, (α and β are constant factors larger than zero). 
Table 6-3. Buffer control of LCS scheme 
1 If (message is generated at the node) 
2 { Add the tag INP to the message; 
3  Put the message into the buffer; 
4 } else if (message is received from other nodes) 
5 { check the tag of the message; 
6  If (the tag is INP) 
7  { put the message into the buffer; 
8  } else if (the tag is SR) 
9  { deliver the message to sink; 
  } 
 } 
When a message is generated at a node, the message is tagged by “INP” first. (All 
messages should be tagged either by “INP” or by “SR.”) For any message with an SR tag, 
the node will deliver it to the sink when the routing scheme of GRAB (cost value field 
routing) is followed. For the message with an INP tag, a probing process would be 
invoked at the node. The probing process is almost the same as that of the central 
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convergence scheme (CCS), except the probing value. Here, the probing value (which is 
the value of signal intensity in CCS) is changed to be the linear super-position value 
(VL.S.). If the VL.S. of the node is the highest, then the tag of the message will become 
“SR”; otherwise, the message will keep its “INP” tag and will be forwarded to the node’s 
neighbor with the highest VL.S.. 
Table 6-4. Publishing control of LCS scheme 
1  while (the timer is run out ) 
2  { aggregate all messages in the buffer; 
3   VLS = -αVc + βVi; 
4   probe VLS of neighbor nodes; 
5   if (exist a neighbor with larger VLS) 
6   { tag the aggregated messages with INP; 
7    select the neighbor with largest VLS; 
8    send the aggregated message to; 
9   } else 
10   { tag the aggregated messages with SR; 
11    send the aggregated messages; 
12    toward sink by cost value field routing; 
13   }empty the buffer; 
14   reset the timer; 
  } 
Two programs are listed here. These two programs should be run at each node 
separately and simultaneously. Inside each node, these two programs exchange data 
through the memory buffer of the node. For the first program, if a message has an INP tag, 
then it will be put into the memory buffer. If a message’s tag is SR, then the message will 
be delivered to the sink node by following the routing scheme of GRAB. Messages 
generated at the node will always be tagged with “INP” first, and then put into the 
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memory buffer. The first program is the same as that of the center convergence scheme 
(CCS), and shown in Table 6-3. 
The second program is in charge of probation and aggregation. In addition, a timer is 
pre-defined to synchronize the entire process. When the timer expires, all messages in the 
memory buffer are aggregated. After that, a probing process is invoked. If the node 
possesses the highest VL.S. among all its neighbor nodes, the aggregated message is 
tagged with “SR,” and delivered by following the scheme of cost value field forwarding 
(GRAB). Otherwise, the aggregated message is tagged INP and sent to the neighbor node 
with the highest VL.S.. 
6.3.3 Analysis of CCS and LCS 
If the sink routing scheme is set to be Cost value field Based Forwarding, CCS is 
only a special case of LCS when α = 0. In this sub-section, the performance of LCS will 
be discussed with α and β adjusted, and the performance of LCS and CCS will be 
compared. 
To simplify the process of analysis, it is assumed that the physical signal field covers 
a round area with a radius R. The highest intensity point (peak) of the field is at the centre 
of the round area. As shown in Figure 6-2, the intensity distribution is: 
 Vi = 0,  for ρ > R;  
 Vi = c1/ρ2,  for R ≥ ρ ≥ ε;  
 Vi = c1/ε2,  for ε > ρ > 0. (6-E1) 
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 Figure 6-1. The distribution of physical signal field 
Here, ρ is the distance to the field center (peak). c1 > 0 and ε > 0 are two constants. 
As shown in Figure 6-3, the distance from the sink node to the centre of the physical 
signal field is D (D > R). For each node, its cost value is Vc = c2d, in which d is the 
distance to the sink, and c2 is another constant (c2>0). 
2ε
2R 
R Point A Sink 
D 
Physical Signal Field 
 
Figure 6-2. Positions of sink and physical signal field 
After the linear superposition (VL.S. = -αVc + βVi), the original physical signal field 
changes to a new field. In addition, the original area of the physical signal field area is 
folded and separated into two parts with two peaks, respectively, as shown in Figure 6-4. 
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It is clear that the maximum value of VL.S. should be on the straight line (Figure 6-3) 
that connects the sink node and the center of the physical signal field. Along the straight 
line, let ρ be the distance to the center of the physical signal field. This produces, 
VL.S. = −αc2(D − ρ) + βc1/ρ2 (6-E2) 
Let the derivative of LSV be zero, and it yields 
(VL.S.)′ = αc2 − 2βc1/ρ3 = 0 , and, 
ρ3 = 2βc1/(αc2) (6-E3) 
Val 
βVi 
-αVc 
New cluster boundary 
Peak 2 
Peak 1 
 
Figure 6-3. The field after LCS scheme 
Therefore, the new cluster boundary, (or the minimum value of the maximum VL.S.s,) 
is at ρ = [2βc1/(αc2)]1/3. Furthermore, when several adjacent physical signal fields exist, 
this new cluster boundary introduces a new clustering scheme which is shown in Figure 
6-4. From the figure, it can be observed that the local peaks (that sensory data converge 
to) are no longer at the centers of the clustered area, but shift toward the sink node. 
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 New cluster boundary 
 
Figure 6-4. New cluster boundary for adjacent signal fields 
Next, it is necessary to analyze the communication expense of in-network processing, 
and the variation of the communication expense, which is caused by the local peaks’ shift. 
Two cases are taken into account. For the first case, the convergence point is at the center 
of the physical signal field. For the second case, the convergence point is at point A of 
Figure 6-5. In order to clarify the analysis, it is assumed that all nodes are distributed 
among the area continuously and transmission conflicts are ignored. Within the physical 
signal field, each node should generate a message. The communication expense (energy 
expense) of a message delivery is equal to the distance that the message travels. In 
addition, all messages would not be aggregated along its way. All messages are 
aggregated at the convergence point. 
When the convergence point is at the center of the physical signal field area 
The total communication expense is  = (2/3)πR3 (6-E4) ∫ R0 d2 ρπρρ
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When the convergence point is at point A, as shown in Figure 6-5, 
The total communication expense is ∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛R0 d22arccos ρρρρρ  = 80R3/9 (6-E5) 
From the results above, when the convergence point is at point A, the total 
communication expense of the data convergence is about four times greater than the total 
communication expense when data converge to the center of the physical signal field. 
However, the distance from point A to the sink is shorter than the distance from the center 
of the physical signal field to the sink. Thus, there is a trade-off with respect to selecting 
the convergence point between point A and the center of the physical signal field.  
2R 
Point A 
ρ 
 
Figure 6-5. Illustration the meaning of variables ρ and R 
By the equation (6-E3) ρ3 = 2βc1/(αc2), and the range limits of ρ (ε ≤ ρ ≤ R), the range 
limits of β/α can also be ascertained; that is c2ε3/(2c1) ≤ β/α ≤ c2R3/(2c1). If β/α > 
c2R3/(2c1), messages are converged to the peak of the physical signal field, and the cluster 
boundary is the same as the boundary of the physical signal field (the same as CCS). If 
the physical signal field is isolated from the others, and β/α < c2ε3/(2c1), messages from 
the physical signal field area are converged to “point A”. If several physical signal fields 
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are adjacent to each other and β/α < c2ε3/(2c1), all those physical fields are soldered into a 
big field, and messages are converged to “point A” of this new big field. If several 
physical signal fields are adjacent to each other, and c2ε3/(2c1) ≤ β/α ≤ c2R3/(2c1), nodes 
will be clustered by the new boundary as shown in Figure 6-5, rather than by the natural 
boundary of the physical signal fields. 
6.4 Simulation 
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Figure 6-6. Simulation model 
Compared to other schemes, this design can cluster nodes with zero overhead. In 
addition, the routing paths within a cluster are constructed automatically. Moreover, the 
scheme will be robust, even if some nodes die. 
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Simulations run over a square area (400×400m2). Within the area, nodes are settled at 
cross-points of a uniform square grid, with the grid spacing d. d is selected to be 12m, 
16m or 20m, respectively. The transmission radius of each node is r, which is set to be 
25m. It is clear that r is greater than d. A physical signal field covers a round area with 
radius R. During the simulation, R varies from 10m to 100m. The peak of the field is at 
the center. Only the communication expense of in-network processing is considered.  
 
Figure 6-7. In-network processing expense per node 
As shown in Figure 6-8, three curves (which correspond to the cases of d = 12, 16, 
and 20, respectively) overlap each other. Since the node density of the network is 1/d2, 
this also implies that the expense is in direct proportion to the node density. In addition, 
the total communication expense goes up sharply when the ratio of R/r increases. For a 
given physical incident, the radius of its physical signal field R is fixed, and only r can be 
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varied. Thus, by increasing r, the expense of in-network processing can be cut down 
sharply. However, by increasing r, more nodes will be covered inside a broadcast area. 
This may incur more transmission collision. As shown in Figure 6-9, the average 
communication expense (cost/R2) goes up with the increasing R/r and node density (1/d2). 
 
Figure 6-8. In-network processing cost per area 
To investigate the performance of LCS when β/α is varied, let R be 50m. In addition, 
let the convergence point move from the center of the physical signal field to the 
boundary of the field to imitate the variation of β/α. Here, “offset” denotes the distance 
that the convergence point deviates from the center of the field. As shown in Figure 6-10, 
all three curves are close to each other, which is similar to cases shown in Figure 6-8. 
Roughly, with the increasing offset (or the convergence point moving toward the 
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boundary of the physical signal field), the average communication expense of in-network 
processing (cost×d2) goes up. 
 
Figure 6-9. Effect of offset on in-network processing cost per node 
Frequently, sensor nodes may run out of their battery and die, and holes will emerge 
inside the WSN area, as shown in Figure 6-11. For a hole with a convex boundary, the 
designs could still make data packets detour the hole for in-network processing. If some 
holes are with concave boundaries, data packets can not detour the holes by following the 
routing designs. In such cases, the clustering designs will split the physical signal field 
area into two small clusters, and data packets in the area will converge to their own local 
peak of these two small clusters, respectively. In Figure 6-11, in addition to the peak of 
the physical signal field, the location of the sensor node P will act as a new local peak. 
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All nodes inside the physical signal field are split and grouped into two clusters. In fact, 
concave holes are common in WSNs, and can prevent a cluster from being too big. 
P sensor 
Peak of 
signal field 
 
Figure 6-10. Concave hole in wireless sensor network 
Summary 
In the chapter, the technology of “in-network processing” is extended, with regards 
to physical incident publishing. Here, physical signal fields are explored. According to 
the designs, sensory data are converged to some local nodes and aggregated there, along 
with the gradient direction of the physical signal fields. In this way, the overhead cost of 
“in-network processing” is reduced, as well as the cost of physical incident publishing. 
Based on the study of Chapters 4, 5, and 6, the incident publishing has been inspected 
thoroughly. In the next chapter, the main results of this research would be reviewed. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
The contributions of this research can be categorized into two aspects: 1). the study 
and designs for logging incidents; 2). the study and designs for publishing incidents. 
Since the two aspects (i.e. designs, implementation and optimization of incident logging 
and publishing) are fundamental for network forensic support, this dissertation is 
expected to lay a cornerstone in the forensic research concerning mobile networks. 
The first two sections of this chapter summarize the main results: Section 7.1 
presents contributions related to incident logging; and section 7.2 presents contributions 
related to incident publishing. In the last section, Section 7.3, the future research is 
considered. 
7.1 Logging Network Incidents 
In addition to time stamp, location is another key component of an incident record, 
because location indicates the place where the incident occurs. For network topology 
spaces, the concept of distance metric is not available. As a result, the location of a node 
can not be measured without a distance metric given. In this research, an innovative 
concept (i.e. Background) is proposed to label locations of nodes. According to this 
research, Background of a node (defined as the neighbor list of the node) is used as a 
substitute for the node’s location. Moreover, the Background of a node at a particular 
time can be viewed as private information of the node, and can even be used to check the 
identity of the node.  
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In Chapter 3, the Background and its applications are studied, and a design has been 
extended to authenticate ad hoc nodes. According to the design, participating nodes of a 
MANET should broadcast their neighbor lists periodically. Correspondingly, each node 
would receive the broadcasted packets from its neighbors, and update its background 
table based on the packets (carrying neighbor lists of its neighbors). In addition, each 
node should log its background table after a given time period.  
Based on these logged background tables, the process of node authentication (i.e. 
Background Checking) can then be conducted. At the beginning of the process, a node 
would be requested to present its Background at a random time point. From the response 
(the node’s Background at this time point) of the node, several neighbors of the node at 
this time point are selected as references of the node. After that, the references of the 
node are contacted, in order to check if the response from the node is conformed to the 
logs of its references.  
The effectiveness of the authentication design has been tested by the logical analysis. 
Furthermore, simulations examine the side-effects of the performance for this 
authentication design. The side-effects include bandwidth consumption and delivery 
delay. The results from the simulations show that the overhead cost of this authentication 
design does not impair the performance of mobile ad hoc networks. 
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7.2 Publishing Network Incidents 
“Incident logging” makes network forensics possible, and “incident publishing” 
makes network forensics feasible. Log files are the resources on which network forensic 
analyses should be based. However, for tracking a particular network incident, how to 
find the related log files is still a question.  
In the designs of Chapter 4, distributed log files are published and organized to 
facilitate the process of incident tracking. In order to efficiently find all related 
information of an incident from numerous log files, these log files should be classified 
and sorted beforehand. Moreover, the design of the classifications and sorting processes 
must be effective in dynamic network circumstances in which log files reside on mobile 
nodes. More importantly, log files must be published willingly in order to have them 
organized.  
This research contributes a new framework of organizing logs by extending the P2P 
technology of Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs). Furthermore, traditional designs 
regarding network traceability (i.e. SPIE, PPM, and ITrace) are incorporated in this new 
framework. Under the architecture of a DHT design, log files are hashed and published 
on some pre-selected nodes, which are determined by the DHT design.  
However, there is a recursion problem during the processes of log publishing. Since 
the delivery of a publishing packet is also a network incident, it needs to be logged at 
intermediate nodes along the packet’s delivery path. Furthermore, logs incurred by the 
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delivery of publishing packets also need to be published. In this way, publishing 
processes would be invoked recursively. As a result, even if one logged incident is trying 
to publish, the processes of log publishing would be invoked endlessly. In the end, these 
recursively populated publishing packets would consume the entire bandwidth of the 
network. In fact, this recursive issue is common in any design of log publishing, 
including the DHT-based designs.  
In this research, a new scheme, Packet-Defined Probabilistic Delivery (PDPD or 
PD2), is developed to overcome this recursion problem. According to the scheme PD2, 
each packet is assigned with a value (i.e. delivery rate) and should be forwarded with the 
probability of this value. In addition, a function f ( ·) is shared by all participating nodes, 
in order to control this value (i.e. delivery rate). With the PD2 design, the total number of 
populated publishing packets is limited throughout the recursive processes. Details of the 
function f ( ·) are also discussed in order to optimize the performance of PD2. Rules and 
criteria for the function construction are listed, as are some instances of f ( ·). At the end of 
the chapter, the performance of the proposed scheme PD2 is analyzed, and its 
effectiveness is examined by simulations.  
In Chapter 5, log (or incident) publishing is discussed in GSM networks, and is 
specified as location publishing. In addition, a specific forensic problem, Movement 
Tracking, is considered. According to the Standard IS-41 (a GSM standard), mobile 
subscribers of a GSM network should always have their current locations published (or 
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registered) on their HLRs. As a result, the subscriber’s movement can be traced by 
referencing their HLRs. In this research, technologies of location publishing are widely 
explored. Based on the design of “anchor chain” [Bej03], a new design has been also 
developed. This new design follows the structure of “anchor chain,” but modifies the 
criterion of “chain update,” in order to improve the performance. The theoretical analysis 
shows that the design can sharply reduce the accumulative cost of “location publishing”. 
In addition, the efficiency of the design is examined by simulations. More importantly, 
the new design would track the subscriber’s movement fast. 
In Chapter 6, the incident publishing is studied in the context of Wireless Sensor 
Networks, in terms of “physical incident publishing.” An innovative design has been 
presented, in order to efficiently publish sensory data (or physical incidents). According 
to the design, the physical signal fields, which sensor nodes are monitoring, are adopted 
to direct local data convergence. This implies that not only artificial architectures (such as 
GSM or DHTs), but also natural architectures (such as physical signal fields) can be used 
for incident/log publishing. At the end of the chapter, the robustness and reliability of the 
design are examined by simulations.  
7.3 Future Work 
7.3.1 Refinement and Extension 
This dissertation suggests that many research issues need to be further explored, such 
as selecting hash functions and particular DHT structures, constructing of the reflexive 
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decreasing function f ( p), etc.. In addition, the improvement of “anchor chain” design, 
which is developed in GSM networks, should be implanted into ad hoc networks in order 
to widen Movement tracking. For this implantation, problems still exist as to how to 
select anchors from mobile nodes and how to update these anchors. Likewise, the designs 
of in-network processing have similar problems when being implanted into mobile 
environment. Therefore, future research needs to focus on tackling these problems. 
Moreover, the modern techniques of “intrusion detection” should be applied to the 
processes of “logging incidents” and “publishing incidents,” in order to classify incidents 
with different suspicious levels. 
The background table of each node contains information of the local topography 
surrounding the node. By logging the background table along with time stamps, the node 
has actually recorded the variation of its local topography. Moreover, the global 
topography of the entire network can be constructed by collecting the logged background 
tables of all nodes. As the global topography must be helpful in network forensics, future 
work can be conducted, in response to constructing the global topography from the 
distributed background tables.  
7.3.2 Issues beyond the Dissertation 
So far, discussions and analyses are surrounding the fundamental issues on which 
forensic activities should base. However, it is also necessary to explore some network 
services with regards to distributing the outcomes of a forensic analysis. For example, the 
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forensic analyst identifies a mobile node as malicious. The analyst also needs to inform 
all other nodes so that they can isolate this malicious node. Therefore, a network service 
of distributing the analysis results is necessary. Meanwhile, this service should avoid 
directly distributing the results to this malicious node. Furthermore, whenever a node 
finds that the malicious node is wandering, an alarm should be activated.  
Also, all network services, designed or expected to be designed, aim to support a 
general forensic analysis, instead of tracking a specific attack. In fact, those network 
services may be designed more delicately if they focus on some specific attacks or 
misbehaviors. For example, for SYN flooding attacks, these attacking packets consist of 
the same destination address and contents, but different source addresses and packet 
sequence numbers. At each mobile node, a forensic mechanism can be designed in order 
to identify the SYN flooding attacks. Whenever a mobile node receives three packets 
with the pattern of a SYN flooding attack (i.e. with the same destination address and 
contents, but different source addresses and packet sequence numbers,) in a short 
duration (say three seconds), the node should refuse to forward these packets for a while 
(say five minutes). Here, time periods (three seconds and five minutes) can be adjusted 
via optimization. 
Overall, there are two sub-fields in the research of network forensic support: 1) 
network services used before forensic analyses, and 2) network services used after 
forensic analyses. Within each sub-field, designed services may focus on a general 
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purpose or on some specific attacks. This research only studies some network services 
used before general forensic analyses, and leaves the other untouched. Thus, future 
research will focus on these untouched issues, with the goal of fulfilling the needs of 
network forensics. 
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